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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RORY J. ATCITTY, by and 
through his parent Roger 
Atcitty, Sr., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v, 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Plaintiff's 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, R. 884-892. 
2. Whether the trial court erred when it entered summary 
judgment for defendants, while summarily dismissing the issues of 
the impartiality of the disciplinarian, the claim that the 
District's policies were vague and ambiguous, and whether 
defendants7 action deprived Plaintiff of his liberty interest. R. 
884-892. 
3. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Plaintiff's 
1 
Case No. 980096-CA 
Priority No. 15 
Motion To Amend The Complaint. R. 884-892. 
Legal determinations regarding summary judgment are questions 
of law and are reviewed for correctness in determining that the 
party is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Salt 
Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp. , 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 
1995); See also Rule 56(c), Ut. R. Civ. P. (Summary judgment may be 
granted only when the record shows that there were no genuine 
issues of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.)x 
Legal determinations regarding amendments are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P. 2d 1381, 1389 (Utah 
1996) . 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Short-term-school suspensions are governed by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (see Addendum 1)
 P as construed in Goss v. Lopez, 419 
1
 Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of 
law, the reviewing court accords no deference to the trial court's 
resolution of the legal issues presented. K & T Inc. v. Koroulisf 
888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994). In examining the trial court's 
order granting summary judgment, the reviewing court determines 
only whether the trial court correctly held that there were no 
disputed issues of material fact. id. The reviewing court views 
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P. 2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). The reviewing court may 
affirm summary judgment on any available ground even if it is one 
not relied upon by the trial court. Id. at 235. The standard for 
review regarding the court's denial of plaintiff's motion to strike 
defendants' summary judgment affidavit is that a reviewing court 
will review the ruling for correctness, determining whether the 
affidavit in question improperly attempted to create disputed 
issues of fact. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 
1983); Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1140-1141 (Utah App. 1990). 
2 
U.S. 565 (1975) (see Addendum 2). The nature, scope and 
application of Goss is dependent on the facts and circumstances of 
the particular case. 
The summary judgment process is governed by Rule 56, Ut.R.Civ. 
P. (See Addendum 3) . This Courts review of the granting or denial 
of summary judgment is governed by the case law set forth in the 
Statement of Issues, supra. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court granting 
Defendants7 summary judgment which entirely disposed of Plaintiff's 
claim that due process was violated during the course of his short-
term suspension from school. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On May 17, 1996, Rory Atcitty (hereafter, Rory), a minor 
child, and through his parent, Roger Atcitty, Sr. (hereafter, Mr. 
Atcitty), filed an action in the Seventh District Court for San 
Juan County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he had been 
denied due process when suspended from school for ten days. R. 1-
5. On May 20, 1996, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking reinstatement 
in school. R. 13-14. The Motion was denied on August 1, 1996. R. 
139-142. Defendants filed an Answer on May 31, 1996. R. 46-51. On 
September 26, 1996 the trial court entered a protective order 
regarding the disclosure and use of certain school district 
records. R. 171-172. On October 23, 1996, the trial court granted 
3 
in part and denied in part Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Certain 
Defenses. R. 183-184. 
On February 14, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. R. 204-205. On February 27, 1997, Defendants 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 473-475. On March 6, 1997, 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and 
an Amended Complaint. R. 678-688. On March 17, 1997, Plaintiff 
filed a Motion to Strike an Affidavit of Lyman Grover submitted in 
support of the Defendants7 Summary Judgment Motion. R. 722-723. On 
April 2, 1997, oral argument was heard on all pending motions. R. 
938. On July 1, 1997, the trial court issued a Memorandum Ruling 
on all pending motions (see Addendum 4a-4d^) . On October 30, 1997, 
the trial court entered summary judgment for defendants, denied 
Plaintiff's Partial Summary Judgment Motion, denied Plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend the Complaint, and denied Plaintiff's Motion to 
Strike the Lyman Grover Affidavit. R. 884-892. On November 24, 
1997, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal. R. 903-904.2 
C. DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
On October 30, 1997, the trial court entered a judgment 
2
 On December 10, 1997, Plaintiff filed a docketing statement. 
On December 18, 1997, Defendants filed in the trial court a Motion 
to Compel the Production of the Transcript of the April 2, 1997 
arguments on the pending motions. R. 914-918. On January 12, 
1998, the trial court ruled that the transcript should be part of 
the record on appeal, that Plaintiff should request the transcript, 
and that the defendants should pay for the transcript. R. 932-935. 
On December 18, 1997 Defendants filed in the Supreme Court a Motion 
to Dismiss Parts of Appellant's appeal. On January 5, 1998, the 
Supreme Court deferred ruling on the motion and instructed the 
parties to proceed to the next stage of the appellate process. On 
February 19, 1998, the Supreme Court entered an Order assigning the 
case to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
4 
granting summary judgment for defendants. At the same time, the 
trial court also entered orders denying Plaintiff's Motions for 
Partial Summary Judgment, Motion to Strike a Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Lyman Grover, and a Motion for Leave to File an 
Amended Complaint. The trial court's judgment and orders disposed 
of the merits of the case. The trial court ruled that Rory Atcitty 
was not deprived of due process when he was suspended from school. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light 
most favorable to Rory Atcitty are as follows: 
On May 13, 1996, Lyman Grover, the principal of Whitehorse 
High School, a secondary education facility operated by the San 
Juan County School District, was investigating the alleged use of 
marijuana by students on a band trip to Colorado. Lyman Grover 
Depositionf R. 940, Page 9. Mr. Grover considered the incident a 
police matter, Id. at Pages 30-31, and considered it to be so from 
the outset of his involvement in the matter. Id. at Pages 13-14. 
Mr. Grover's actions were in accordance with District policy 
requiring that principals involve the police when crimes have been 
committed and that charges be brought. San Juan County School 
District Memorandum, April 25, 1994, R. 415-416; San Juan County 
School District Memorandum, September 29f 1993f R. 418; San Juan 
County School District Policy Number 7333, R. 236. The policies, 
however, are silent as to how or when law enforcement should be 
involved or to what degree law enforcement should affect the 
suspension process. Id. Mr. Grover's intention was to refer the 
5 
matter to law enforcement and thereby restrict his authority to 
act. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 13-14. He 
considered his role as gathering information for law enforcement. 
Id. at Pages 37, 53-54. Accordingly, he provided reports of 
student interviews and summaries of his investigation only to the 
police and compelled the students, including Rory, to go to a 
meeting with a police officer where they could be interrogated and 
arrested. Id. at Pages 31-33, 35-38, 39. Mr. Atcitty likewise 
considered the allegations and Mr. Grover's investigation to be 
criminal in nature and that his son could be charged with a crime. 
Roger Atcitty, Sr. Deposition, R. 939 at Pages 7-9. Accordingly, 
Mr. Atcitty instructed Rory that he should not talk with the 
principal unless he was present. Id. Mr. Atcitty made arrangements 
to retain legal counsel and so informed Mr. Grover. Lyman Grover 
Depositionf R. 940, at Page 20. 
On May 13, Mr. Grover learned that Rory may have been involved 
in the band-trip incident. Lyman Grover Depositionf R. 940, at 
Pages 10, 12. Mr. Grover spoke with Rory's father, provided some 
information to the parent about the matter, but refused to provide 
the names of others who had important information about the 
incident. Id. at Pages 15-16. He also told Mr. Atcitty that he 
would make no deals concerning Rory's situation. Id* at Page 17. 
Mr. Grover explained some of the procedures relating to the 
investigation, and assured Mr. Atcitty that Rory had the right to 
face his accusers under some circumstances. Id. at Pages 17-18. 
Mr. Grover failed to advise Mr. Atcitty of suspension procedures, 
6 
including the District's ten-day suspension policy for first-time 
drug violations, and did not identify other possible terms of 
suspension or other punishment. Id. at Pages 18-19. Mr. Grover 
likewise failed to mention alternate-education services, hearing 
procedures for aggrieved students before the Board of Education, 
the right of a post-suspension parent conference, not did he inform 
Mr. Atcitty of whether, and when, Rory would be provided an 
opportunity to present his side of the story, id. Mr. Grover 
testified that at the time he was talking with the parents, he was 
not sure that he was referring to a short-term suspension or an 
expulsion, each of which has different procedures and consequences. 
Id. at Page 19. Mr. Grover testified that Mr. Atcitty told him 
that he was not talk to Rory unless he was present, id. at Pages 
23-25, and although the principal intended to question Rory, he 
never responded to Mr. Atcitty7s request not to speak with Rory. 
Id. at Pages 20, 23. Mr. Grover did not attempt to speak with Rory 
on May 13, when Mr. Atcitty was available. See Id. at Pages 14-22. 
Although Rory's father requested that Mr. Grover provide a 
hearing and an explanation of the process involved, neither were 
provided. Roger Atcitty Sr. Depositionf R. 939, at Pages 24, 26. 
District policies and procedures were unclear as to exactly when in 
the expulsion or suspension process the student would be afforded 
an opportunity to present his side of the story,3 or exactly when 
3
 However, apparently this opportunity was meant to be 
afforded only at the time when the principal announced his 
disciplinary decision. See Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, Pages 
28, 18-19. 
7 
or under what circumstances the student must be warned of the 
consequences if he chooses to not tell his side of the story when 
given that opportunity. Compare, Plaintiffs Summary Judgment 
Exhibits 1(a) through 1(e), R. 233-348. 
On May 14, 1996, Mr. Grover attempted to question Rory about 
the incident when they were alone and without Mr. Atcitty being 
present, Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 23-27, but Rory 
refused to talk to him. Id. at Page 25. The purpose of this 
meeting was to enable Mr. Grover to ask questions about the alleged 
incident. Rory Atcitty Deposition, R. 941, at Pages 29-34. During 
this encounter Rory was not told he was suspended nor was he 
informed about suspension procedures, Id. at 28, about hearing 
procedures, possible punishments, his right to a post-suspension 
parent conference, or that disciplinary measures were going to be 
taken against him. .Id. at 24-37. Rory did not have the evidence 
which was the basis of the allegations explained to him, and most 
significantly, was not warned of the consequences of not discussing 
the matter, or that this was his only chance to tell his side of 
the story. Id. 
That same day, in response to a telephone call from his son, 
Mr. Atcitty went to the school and had a brief conversation with 
Mr. Grover, again stressing he did not want his son to discuss the 
incident with school officials because of the criminal nature of 
the situation unless he was present. Roger Atcitty Sr. Deposition, 
R. 939, Pages 9, 7-8 (emphasis added). Again, Mr. Grover failed to 
inform Mr. Atcitty of the disciplinary procedures or process. Lyman 
8 
Grover Deposition. R. 940, at Page 28, despite Mr. Atcitty having 
asked for this information. Roger Atcitty Sr. Deposition,, R. 939, 
at Page 24. Mr. Grover testified that his policy was to not 
explain what the suspension procedures were to the students until 
he had decided what action to take. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 
940, at Page 28. Mr. Grover further testified that he had not 
decided what to do with Rory at that point other than, as he told 
Mr. Atcitty, Id., that he was continuing his investigation. Roger 
Atcitty, Sr. Deposition, R. 939, at Pages 9-10. He did not warn Mr. 
Atcitty that this would be Rory,s only opportunity to be heard. 
Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 22-28. Mr. Atcitty left 
his encounter with the principal at "a total loss" as to what was 
going to happen next. Id. at Page 8. 
On May 16, 1996, Mr. Grover called law enforcement. Lyman 
Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 30-31. A police officer 
arrived and was given the students' statements and other reports. 
Id. at Pages 37, 53-54. The students alleged to be involved in the 
incident were then called to the principal's office, informed that 
they were suspended from school, Id. at Pages 36-37, and then were 
interrogated by the police officer. Id. at Pages 36-39. 
During the officer's interrogation, Rory denied being involved 
in the incident. Lyman Grover Affidavit, R. 513, 516, f 9. The 
officer then arrested the students and placed them in police 
custody. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 39. At no time 
during this confrontation did Mr. Grover tell the students, 
including Rory, about hearing procedures, alternate-education 
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services, alternatives regarding punishment, the right to a post-
suspension parent conference, provide them with the right to give 
their side of the story, or give them the right to speak in 
mitigation of punishment. Id. at Pages 36-37. Ignoring Rory's 
statement, Mr. Grover later gave Mr. Atcitty a notice of suspension 
which claimed that Rory said nothing. See Student Behavior 
Referral, R. 420. 
Following his suspension and arrest, Rory was allowed to 
remain at school while his parents were contacted. Lyman Grover 
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 40-42. Mr. Atcitty was called to the 
school and upon arriving spoke briefly with Mr. Grover. id. at 
Pages 40-42. Mr. Grover advised Mr. Atcitty of Rory's suspension 
from school. Id. at Pages 41-43. Mr. Grover explained some of the 
terms of the suspension and provided Mr. Atcitty with a notice of 
suspension. Id. Mr. Grover also failed to advise Mr. Atcitty of 
District's policies and procedures other than to tell Mr. Atcitty 
that Rory would have to find and participate in a drug 
rehabilitation program if he wanted to come back to school before 
the end of the ten-day suspension period. Id. 
During the suspension, the District provided some home-
schooling services to Rory. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at 
Pages 44-49. However, it was not until six days after Rory was 
suspended that he began receiving home-schooling services. Roger 
Atcitty Sr. Deposition, R. 939, at Pages 16-18. The reason for the 
delay was that the school had no home-schooling program in place. 
Id. at Pages 13-18. Mr. Grover indicated that he received daily 
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reports and there was no indication that Rory was uncooperative in 
the home-schooling program. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at 
Page 48. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Plaintiff a partial summary 
judgment because there were no disputed issues of material fact and 
Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
On May 13-14, Mr. Grover met with Mr. Atcitty. On neither 
occasion did Mr. Grover provide Mr. Atcitty (or Rory) with the 
suspension policies and procedures, or with a specific explanation 
of the basis for the allegations about drug use on a school band 
trip. On May 14, Mr. Grover questioned Rory but did not tell him 
he was being suspended or that this encounter was actually a 
hearing after which he would have no further opportunity to give 
his side of the story. Rory and his father had every reasonable 
expectation that they would be given an opportunity to speak at 
some later time, and that they would be given additional 
information about the procedures and disciplinary process, that 
they would be informed of the basis of the allegations. Neither 
encounter, therefore, was a hearing and did not constitute a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard. 
The May 16th meeting between Rory, the other students, Mr. 
Grover, and the police officer was not a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard. Mr. Grover only announced Rory's suspension without 
giving Rory the opportunity to be heard and without providing him 
with important information about the suspension process, including 
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post-suspension services. This encounter was primarily for the 
purpose of enabling the police to interrogate and arrest Rory. An 
encounter later in the day between Mr. Grover and Mr. Atcitty 
likewise did not satisfy Due Process requirements. Under the 
circumstances of Rory's suspension, he should have, but was not, 
afforded enhanced due process protection, including the right to a 
clear and specific description of the evidence, the right to 
confront his accusers, and the right to have his parents and 
counsel present. The denial of these rights was compounded by the 
fact that Mr. Grover was not impartial because he had a law 
enforcement agenda and role. Moreover, Mr. Grover had taken a 
hard-line position that he would not ameliorate Rory's situation in 
any way even though at the time he made this comment the 
investigation was not complete. In addition, Rory was denied 
adequate home-schooling services during his suspension, benefits 
that were required as part of the fair-hearing process. 
The trial court erred in granting Defendants7 summary judgment 
because (1) Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, and (2) there were disputed issues of material fact. The 
trial court also erred in denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Mr. 
Grover's Affidavit. This affidavit was submitted to support 
Defendants' claim for summary judgment and to raise purported 
disputed facts to frustrate Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion. 
The trial court erred in denying Plaintiff leave to file an 
amended complaint because the motion was timely, raised no new 
issues, and otherwise complied with procedural requirements 
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relating to amendment of pleadings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
a. Introduction, Summary Judgment Standards. 
Rory Atcitty was entitled to a summary judgment on the 
question of whether he had notice and an adequate and timely 
opportunity to be heard.4 On this point the essential facts are 
undisputed, making summary judgment appropriate because Rory was 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Bruce v. Martin Marietta 
Corp. , 544 F.2d 422, 445 (10th Cir. 1976) (quoting Rule 56(c)); 
Andreini v. Hultcrren. 860 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 1993).5 
4
 There is a pending motion by Appellees to dismiss this 
portion of the appeal. If the motion is granted, Appellant asks 
that this Court take into account the arguments made in this 
section of the brief when considering whether the trial court 
should have granted defendants summary judgment. See Point 2. 
5
 Only the due process issues are discussed in this portion of 
Appellants' brief. The other elements of Rory7s claim were 
admitted by the defendants: Rory J. Atcitty was a minor child 
bringing the action through his parent, Roger J. Atcitty, 
Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, R. 1, f 1, Defendants' Answer, R. 
46, fl I.A; Rory was a student living at Bluff, San Juan County, 
Utah and attending a secondary education facility known as 
Whitehorse High School at Montezuma Creek, Utah. Plaintiff7s 
Verified Complaint, R. 1, f 1, Defendants7 Answer, R. 46-47, \ I.A; 
Defendant Board of Education of The San Juan County School District 
is the duly elected administrative and governing body of the San 
Juan School District in San Juan County, Utah. Plaintiffs Verified 
ComplaintP R. 1-2, J 2, Defendants7 Answer, R. 46-47, f I.A.; Lyman 
Grover is an employee of the District and the principal of 
Whitehorse High School. Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, R. 2, f 3, 
Defendants7 Answer, R. 46-47, \ I.A; Defendants7 actions were taken 
under the color of laws, customs, and practices of the State of 
Utah, and under the color of their respective offices as officers 
and agents of the State of Utah, Plaintiff7s Verified Complaintf R. 
2, J 4, Defendants7 Answer, R. 46-47, f I.A. 
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b. Introduction, Due Process In Education Standards. 
A student's interest in a public education is a property 
interest. Meyers v. Bd. Of Educ. Of San Juan, 905 F.Supp. 1544, 
1557-1559, 1568-1569 (D. Utah. 1995); Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).6 This property interest is protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Goss v. Lopez, 
419 U.S. 565, 572-576; Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th 
Cir. 1975). The review of due process procedures is measured by 
federal law. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 152 (1988) (federal 
law applies in state-court Section 1983 actions); Lucas v. Murray 
City Civil Service Commission, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Utah App. 
1997). Minimum due process requirements imposed by federal law may 
not be diminished by state law. Id. 
In Goss, the Court held that a student facing short-term 
suspension for disciplinary reasons is entitled to a hearing, 
stating "that the student be given oral or written notice of the 
charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the 
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his 
side of the story." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581. The Court 
6
 Property interests "are created by and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law." Board Of Regents v. Rothr 
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The property interest in education is 
recognized under Utah state law. See, e.g., Utah Constitutionr 
Article X, §§ 1 & 2; Article II, Fourth; Act of July 16, 1894, Ch. 
138, § 3, Fourth, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1893-95); Logan City Sch. 
Dist. v. Kowallis, 77 P.2d 348, 350-351 (Utah 1938); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 53A-17a-102(l) (1994). Although Rory's property interest in 
education has been long established, cases such as Meyers only 
recently compelled the San Juan School District to recognize its 
obligation to educate Native Americans children. See also Seamons 
v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 1996). 
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also reasoned that student suspensions sufficiently resembled 
traditional judicial and administrative fact finding hearings and 
therefore a hearing was appropriate, id. at 583-584; see also Board 
of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1977). 
Due process requires that one be given the opportunity to be 
heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong 
v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). This opportunity to be heard 
must be flexible and appropriate to the nature of the case. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Lucas 
v. Murray City Civil Service Commission, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 
n.4. 
Once it is determined that education is a protected property 
interest, the next question is how much process is due. Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972). Following Goss, the Supreme 
Court clarified how much due process is due by adopting a three-
factor balancing test. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
These factors must be applied in a flexible manner and tailored to 
the circumstances of each particular case.7 The interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause therefore involves intensely practical 
applications in a manner which precludes "any concept of inflexible 
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." 
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see also 
7
 The three factors are (1) the private interest that will be 
affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the government's 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards would entail. Id. at 335. 
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Roach v. University of Utah, 968 F.Supp. 1446, 1451 (D.Utah 1997). 
c. Initial Encounters Between Student, Parent And Principal. 
(1) Notice Of The Opportunity To Be Heard. 
Rory and his father had two encounters with Mr. Grover on May 
13-14, during the initial investigation of the allegations that 
students had used marijuana on a school band trip. Neither 
encounter was a constitutionally adequate due-process "hearing" 
because Rory was never provided with an opportunity to be heard "at 
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U.S. 545, 552. A prerequisite to the right to be meaningfully 
heard is adequate notice. Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 3 39 
U.S. 306, 313. 
Notice sufficient to alert Rory about the allegations, that he 
was being suspended, an explanation of the disciplinary process, 
and that he had a definite time in which to respond to the 
principal's action is required by Due Process before the action is 
taken. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582, 584; Cleveland Board 
of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (Notice, an 
explanation of the evidence, and the opportunity to be heard are 
necessary before action is taken (emphasis in original)); see also 
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 115 (1990); James v. Unified 
School Dist. No. 512, 899 F.Supp. 530, 535 (D.Kan. 1995); Lucas v. 
Murray City Civil Service Commission, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18 
(citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306, 
313). The first two encounters failed to comply with these 
standards as well. 
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On May 13, when Mr. Grover spoke with Mr. Atcitty, he gave him 
a cursory description of the situation. Mr. Atcitty attempted to 
informally resolve the matter, but Mr. Grover, despite his not 
having finished his investigation and despite not being in full 
possession of the facts, took a hard line attitude that there would 
be no deals or accommodations. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at 
Page 17. Mr. Atcitty responded by saying that he did not want his 
son interrogated unless he was present. 
On May 14, Mr. Grover did approach Rory without any regard to 
Mr. Atcitty7s concern about the criminal nature of the accusations 
or his desire to be present. Mr. Grover failed to warn Rory that 
this meeting was actually a "hearing" and that it would be his only 
opportunity to defend himself. This was not adequate notice. 
Moreover, there was nothing in the confused multitude of rules and 
policies and student handbooks that would have placed Rory on 
notice that this would be his only opportunity to state his side of 
the story. Indeed, a reasonable reading of the facts and 
circumstances in a light most favorable to Rory shows that both he 
and his father went away from the first encounter with Mr. Atcitty 
(on May 13) with the feeling that they would have an opportunity to 
be heard at a later time. Another reasonable assumption by Rory 
and his father was that this stage of the process was merely fact-
finding and not adjudicative. Mr. Grover testified that he was 
simply conducting an investigation at that point, one that would 
continue following his brief talk with the Atcittys. Rory 
testified that the meeting was only used by Mr. Grover to ask 
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questions about the alleged incident. Rory Atcitty Deposition, R. 
941, at pages 29-34. Certainly, Mr. Grover did nothing to dispel 
the impression that Rory would be able to speak about the 
allegations at some point down the road. Indeed, Mr. Grover 
testified that he had a policy of not explaining disciplinary 
policies and procedures to students until after he had decided what 
to do. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 28. Although this 
may have been consistent with the policy that matters be addressed 
at the time of suspension, the Atcittys were not aware of what was 
happening. 
If the District claims that these first two encounters were 
sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement, defendant should be 
estopped from making this argument because what the Mr. Grover 
said, and more importantly what he failed to say, were misleading. 
cf. Colorado Water, Etc. v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958, 964 
(Colo. En Banc 1982). It is especially noteworthy that Mr. Grover 
failed to provide Mr. Atcitty with any explanation of the 
disciplinary process despite his repeated requests for this 
information. Roger Atcitty Deposition, R. 939, at Page 24. 
Notice of the opportunity to be heard is a fundamental aspect 
of due process. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895. 
In this case no notice was given. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 
579, the Court stated that the timing and content of the notice of 
the right to be heard depends upon an appropriate accommodation of 
the competing interests involved. Accommodating the interests of 
Rory and the District would have been easy to do in this case. Mr. 
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Grover had spoken to the other students during his investigation 
and presumably had their allegations when questioning Rory, See 
Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 23. Mr. Grover should 
have told Rory that he was being suspended, identified and 
explained the evidence behind the allegations, and told him that 
their meeting on May 14 would be his only opportunity to give his 
side of the story. 
Rory's due process interest in his education could have been 
effectively balanced against the school district's right to 
administer discipline in its schools by simply warning and advising 
the student that he must respond to the charges when first 
approached by the principal, cf. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) (disciplinary rule regarding 
offensive speech along with pre-speech admonitions of teachers 
provided adequate warning and notice to the student) (emphasis 
added).8 
The Utah Supreme Court followed Goss by holding that notice of 
the opportunity to be heard must contain the type of information 
that is reasonably calculated to alert one that the matter is 
pending and that a particular time is proper to be heard in a 
proper manner. Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept. , 616 P. 2d 598, 601-
602 (Utah 1980). To follow Goss, 419 U.S. 565, 581, Mr. Grover 
should have announced his decision, explained the basis for his 
8
 Of course since Mr. Grover was functioning as a police agent 
rather than a school administrator, an even more compelling case is 
made that the balancing of school and student interests require 
that Rory would at the outset receive clear explanations and 
warnings by the principal. 
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allegations and suspension, and then afford Rory an opportunity to 
speak. Mr. Grover's communications with Mr. Atcitty and attempted 
questioning of Rory completely fail to comport with this standard. 
Mr. Grover said nothing to warn Mr. Atcitty (or Rory) that Rory was 
being suspended, why he was being suspended, or that this would be 
the only time and place to be heard about the allegations. Indeed, 
he only asked questions to obtain information. Rory Atcitty 
Deposition, R. 941, at Pages 29-34. Mr. Grover's "notice11 
therefore clearly had little due process "reality or worth." Id. at 
601 & n.7 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 314-315); see also Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 
1212 (Utah 1983) (inadequate or ambiguous notice violates due 
process); Siblerud v. Colorado State Bd. Of Agriculture, 896 
F.Supp. 1506, 1516 (D.Colo. 1995). 
(2) There Was No Meaningful Opportunity To Be Heard. 
The May 13 encounter with Mr. Atcitty was not an adequate 
hearing because Rory was not present. The District requires that 
the student be present during a hearing. School District Policy No. 
FHA (4)
 f R. 340. Mr. Grover also did not have all of the facts, 
and had not provided Mr. Atcitty with what he did know. No 
meaningful exchange occurred between them about the allegations. 
And, significantly, Mr. Grover failed to provide Mr. Atcitty with 
an explanation of the disciplinary process despite Mr. Atcitty7s 
having repeatedly requested this information. Roger Atcitty Sr. 
Deposition, R. 939, at Page 24. 
The May 14 encounter between Rory and Mr. Grover was not an 
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adequate due process hearing. Rory would not respond to Mr. 
Grovels questions without his father, something that Mr. Grover 
was aware of. This was a reasonable approach for Rory because he 
had every expectation that his parents would be present since Mr. 
Grover had said nothing to the contrary when Mr. Atcitty told him 
that he did not want his son questioned unless he was present. 
Moreover, Rory could infer from the circumstances of meeting that 
Mr. Grover was simply making inquiries, see Rory Atcitty 
Deposition, R. 941, at Pages 29-34, and not holding a hearing, a 
reasonable assumption since Mr. Grover did not warn him that this 
would be his only chance to speak. 
Significantly, Mr. Grover did not notify Rory that he had made 
up his mind about what action to take or explain the basis for his 
action, both prerequisites to triggering the student's obligation 
to state his side of the story. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 571 n. 
6, 581-582. Indeed, Mr. Grover acknowledged at that point that he 
had not decided what to do until two days later (May 16) following 
his conversation with the Superintendent of Schools. Mr. Atcitty 
went to the school after the principal had attempted to speak with 
Rory, but was not told that the investigation was finished, a 
decision had been made, or that this was the only time for his son 
to give his side of the story. Mr. Grover's investigation was at 
that point still continuing. His inquires could not reasonably be 
construed as a hearing because all he wanted to do was ask 
questions. See Rory Atcitty Deposition, R. 941, at Pages 29-34. 
This was evident because he did not announce a decision, attempt to 
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explain the evidence, and did not ask for or obtain Rory's denial, 
all required by Goss. Id. at 581. The lack of clear and definite 
notice that a hearing would take place, see Point cf1)
 f supra., 
ensured that the May 14 encounters would not have been an adequate 
opportunity to prepare and be heard which is essential to any 
legitimate due-process hearing. 
d. The Last Encounters Between Student, Parent & Principal. 
Rory received no advance notice or an opportunity to prepare 
for the May 16th meeting at which he was suspended. The encounter 
was completely inadequate as a "meaningful opportunity" to be 
heard. Home-schooling and other issues in mitigation of 
punishment, essential to the fair-hearing process, were denied or 
not properly addressed. 
(1) Notice Was Inadequate. 
Neither Rory nor Mr. Atcitty had advance warning of the May 16 
meeting. The student had no opportunity to collect his thoughts 
and prepare for the meeting. It is not surprising that he was 
completely unprepared to articulate a defense, other than to make 
a simple denial. This lack of notice and the opportunity to 
properly prepare an adequate response constitutes a violation of 
due process. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1212 (citing Uhler 
v. Secretary of Health & Mental Hygiene, 412 A.2d 1287 (Md. 1980) 
and Myers v. Moreno, 564 S.W.2d 83 (Mo.App. 1978)).9 
9
 The failure of Mr. Grover to verbally provide notice of the 
rules and procedures is aggravated by the District's vague and 
ambiguous policies. A school district must have policies which are 
specific as to disciplinary matters to the extent that students are 
provided notice of these procedures. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-
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Whether timing of the "hearing" in Rory's suspension from 
school comports with Due Process must be analyzed according to the 
three-part balancing test outlined in Matthews. Although Rory 
asserted that the May 13-16 encounters were not timely and failed 
to give him an adequate opportunity to be heard, the trial court 
failed to undertake the Matthews analysis on these questions. See 
Ruling On Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, R. 804-806 (see 
Addendum 4b); Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment, R. 814-816 (see Addendum 4a). These errors require that 
the judgment of the trial court be reversed. 
(2) There Was No Meaningful Opportunity To Be Heard. 
It is clear that Principal Grover used the meeting with the 
police only to announce the students7 suspensions. Lyman Grover 
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 31-33, 35-38, 39. He never asked Rory 
to give his side of the story. Id. The other purpose of the 
meeting was to bring the students together so that they could be 
interrogated and arrested by the police. Id. During the officer's 
interrogation, Rory did make a brief protestation of innocence. Id. 
902; 53A-11-903. Confusion abounds as to exactly what the 
District's policies may have been at the time that Rory was 
suspended. There may have been at least five different policies. 
Apparently some were obsolete. See Plaintiff's Summary Judgment 
Exhibits, R. 234-348, Exhibits l(a)-l(e). Although the extent of 
clarity of District policies may be a disputed issue of fact, see 
Point Two, supra, uncertainty as to which rules are applicable or 
whether they are clear and specific is a significant factor in 
determining whether due process has been violated. Haynes v. Mayor 
and Council of Borough Of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976); 
Mitchell v. King, 363 A.2d 68, 70-71 (Conn. 1976); McCall v. State. 
354 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1978); State v. Martinez, 538 P.2d 521, 524 
(Wash. 1975); Bertens v. Stewart, 453 So.2d 92, 93-94 (Fla. App. 2d 
Dist. 1984). 
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This denial apparently went unacknowledged when Mr. Grover wrote in 
the notice of suspension that the student had said nothing about 
the allegations. Student Behavior Referral, R. 420. But what little 
Rory said pertained to a police, not a school matter, and can 
hardly be a satisfactory substitute for the due process right of 
the student to have a meaningful opportunity to provide his side of 
the story.10 
After telling Mr. Atcitty that his son would have the right, 
under some circumstances, to confront his accusers, Lyman Grover 
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 17-18, Mr. Grover should have afforded 
Rory this opportunity. Withholding information by refusing to 
provide the names of the student-informants, Id. at 16, as well as 
concealing the statements provided by the students by giving them 
only to the police, Id. at 31-33, effectively denied Rory the right 
to confront and challenge the evidence. See, e.g., Lucas v. Murray 
City Civil Service Commission, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 20. This act 
created the very problem cautioned against in Goss, that there 
should be safeguards to avoid "erroneous deprivations." Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580; see also American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995). 
In Goss, the Supreme Court held that school suspensions of ten 
days or less require a hearing of "at least an informal give-and-
10
 The colloquy between the officer and Rory clearly only had 
a law enforcement and not an educational purpose. In addition to 
questioning the students, the officer used the occasion to lecture 
the students about breaking the law. The officer also took all 
students into custody and arranged for them to be taken or sent 
home. 
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take between student and disciplinarian." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 
565, 581-584; see also State Ex Rel. Yarber v. McHenry, 915 S.W.2d 
325, 328 (Mo.banc 1995); Board Of Curators, Univ. Of Mo. v. 
Horowitz., 435 U.S. 78, 86. The May 16 confrontation between the 
police, Mr. Grover and the students can hardly be viewed as the 
give-and-take atmosphere contemplated by the Supreme in Goss. 
Rory was also not afforded a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard on all matters in mitigation of punishment, regardless of 
whether he was guilty of misconduct. Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 
744, 746-747 (8th Cir. 1975); Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unit 
School Dist. No. 2, 826 F.2d 526, 528-529 (7th Cir. 1987); cf. 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 488 (parolee found in 
violation of parole conditions has right to argue against parole 
revocation). The District's policies likewise grant a student the 
right to be heard as to punishment, School Policy No. FHAf4^r R. 
340, although the drug policy and the Whitehorse High School policy 
are silent on this point. See School District Policy No. FGAB, R. 
656-665; Whitehorse High School 1995-1996 Student/Parent Handbook, 
Discipline, R. 648-650. 
Rory's first encounter with the principal involved only Mr. 
Grover's inquiry into whether misconduct had occurred, Lyman Grover 
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 23-27, and not as to punishment, Id., 
at Page 25 (Mr. Grover states that he had not decided what action 
to take at time of first encounter). However, Mr. Grover did 
refuse to ameliorate Rory's situation in any way when he informed 
the student's father early on in the week that he, the principal, 
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would countenance no deals. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at 
Page 17. This hard-line position, taken when the student's 
culpability was still very much unresolved, and several days before 
the principal formally made up his mind as to what action to take, 
demonstrates that Rory was not given an adequate chance to 
ameliorate his punishment. 
In the second encounter involving the police officer, Mr. 
Grover provided Mr. Atcitty with no opportunity to present matters 
in mitigation. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 35-37. 
Mr. Grover admitted he did not talk to the students about post-
suspension services, including home-schooling. Id. at 36. Nor did 
Mr. Grover broach this subject when talking with Mr. Atcitty later 
in the day when he came in to pick up Rory. Id. at 40-43.1X This 
violated due process. See also Point 2b(l), infra. 
(3) Failure To Provide Home-Schooling Services 
Tainted the Hearing Process. 
Part of the suspension-hearing process is the provision of 
home-schooling services to the student. These are required by the 
District's disciplinary procedures,12 and Utah state law, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 53A-11-906-907. The student may elect to fulfill the ten-
11
 The principal's failure to speak with the father about this 
subject is consistent with Mr. Grover7s earlier hard-line attitude, 
forthrightly communicated to Mr. Atcitty several days earlier, that 
he would no consider no deals. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at 
Page 17. A fair inference is that the principal's no-deals-
position certainly slammed the door on any action which would have 
ameliorated Rory's punishment. 
12
 E.g., School District Policy No. 7335(3), R. 238; School 
District Policy No. FFr3), R. 252; School District Policy No. 
FGABfAHlUa) , R. 255. 
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day suspension obligation by either entering an alcohol 
rehabilitation program or by receiving home-schooling services. San 
Juan School District Policy No. FGABfAHDa-b, R. 255. Despite 
these requirements, Mr. Grover admitted that he did not discuss 
these or other post-suspension procedures or services when meeting 
with the students on May 16. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at 
Page 36. 
Rory chose home-schooling services. These services were not 
adequately provided to Rory because the school had no such program 
in place. Roger Atcitty Sr. Depositionf R. 939, at Pages 13-18. 
Indeed, Rory had to wait out the first six days of his suspension 
before he was provided with such services. Id. at 16-17. In order 
to get these services, Rory's parents had to force the issue. Id. 
at 13-17. Since home-schooling services are part in parcel of the 
District's due process hearing procedure, the failure of the 
District to adhere to its own policy on this matter constitutes a 
due process violation. See Galveston Independent School Pis, v. 
Booths, 590 S.W.2d 553, 555-557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (failure of 
District to follow its own rules is a factor in determining whether 
there is a due process violation); cf. Lucas v. Murray City Civil 
Service Commission, 331 Utah. Adv. Rep. 15, 18-19.13 
13
 The significance of this point as a due process issue is 
underscored by the fact that none of the other suspended students 
were provided with alternate education services. When asked why, 
the principal responded by saying that other parents did not ask 
for it. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 44-55. The 
District apparently employed a practice in this case which was 
inconsistent with its own procedures when it failed to have 
available an established home-services program, a shortcoming 
which, significantly, violated state requirements. Utah Code Ann. 
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e. The "Impartial" Disciplinarian. 
Although it may be disputed that Mr. Grover was an impartial 
disciplinarian, see Point 2b(2), infra, a fair reading of the facts 
most favorable to Rory demonstrates that he was not impartial. The 
trial court at first refused to decide this issue because it was 
not raised in plaintiff's original complaint. See Ruling On 
Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, R. 814-815. The 
trial court, however, went on to decide the question on the merits. 
Id., at R. 815. Accepting and then disposing of plaintiff's claim 
in this fashion makes the issue amenable to appellate review.14 
An impartial disciplinarian is an essential component of the 
fair-hearing required by due process. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 
446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). The test is not whether the principal 
was impartial in fact but whether the average person would question 
his impartiality. United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 511 (10th 
Cir. 1979). A reasonable person would question Principal Grover's 
impartiality. 
Mr. Grover performed in two capacities while suspending Rory 
from school. First, he acted as a school official administering 
school discipline and school policy. Second, he acted as an agent 
of the police. He became a police agent when he gathered 
information for law enforcement. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, 
§ 53A-11-906; see also Synder v. Farnsworth, 896 F.Supp. 96, 99 
(N.D.N.Y. 1995). 
14
 If this Court accepts Rory's argument that he was entitled 
to file and proceed on his amended complaint, then review of this 
issue can proceed on this basis as well. 
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at Pages 37, 53-54. He continued in this role by submitting 
reports of student interviews and summaries of his investigation to 
law enforcement and by compelling Rory and the other students to 
gather so that a police officer could interrogate and arrest them. 
Id. , at Pages 31-33, 35-38, 39. He was abrupt with the students at 
the time he suspended them, did not encourage Rory or the others to 
respond to him, and merely presented them with a fait accompli in 
terms of punishment. See, e.g., Id. at Pages 32-37. While this may 
be consistent with the role of a police officer who can be more 
judgmental while investigating a crime, it is entirely inconsistent 
with a school administrator's obligation to act fairly toward his 
students. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-584; University 
Disciplinary Process, 1987 Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96, Pages 2132, 
2140-2150. 
Mr. Grover's dual role is constitutionally suspect because 
when he became involved in a law enforcement matter he was 
subjected to a higher standard of constitutional conduct than he 
would have been if he had not assisted the police but merely acted 
in an educational capacity. See of., New Jersey v. T.L.O. , 469 U.S. 
325 (1985) (school officials are state actors and subject to 
constitutional restrictions when conducting themselves in matters 
that are quasi-criminal in nature). Although there may be no 
absolute right to disqualify a principal who is both an 
investigator and an adjudicator, see, e.g., Brewer By Dreyfus v. 
Austin Independent Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 1985), 
the extent of Mr. Grover's involvement with the police created a 
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bias which deprived Rory of fundamental fairness in the suspension 
process. See Id. (citing and quoting Sullivan v. Houston Indep. 
School Dist. . 475 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir.), cert, denied,, 414 
U.S. 1032 (1973)) (facts occasionally may demonstrate that a school 
official's involvement in an incident created a bias precluding his 
affording a student an impartial hearing); see also Staton v. 
Mayes , 552 F.2d 908, 913-915 (10th Cir. 1977). 
There is a particular need for heightened due-process 
protection when the police are involved in a significant way.15 
This is evident in Rory's situation because the police officer was 
given the fruits of Principal Grover's investigation. The officer 
was also provided with the best possible opportunity and conditions 
to interrogate and then arrest the students. This involvement is 
certainly "significant." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
487 (1971) (resolution of whether a person becomes an agent of the 
police is determined by the totality of the circumstances); see 
also Annotation, Admissibility in Criminal Case of Evidence 
Obtained by Search by Private Individual, 36 A.L.R.3d 553, 567-571 
(1971, 1987 & 1997 Supp.); W.LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 1.8(d) 
(3d ed. 1996). The mixing of police and educator roles placed Rory 
in a tenuous position. He was faced with a Hobson/s choice. He 
could remain silent and risk the loss of his valuable property 
15
 Veronia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct 2386, 2393, 
2396-2397 (1995); People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 326 (111. 
1996); M. v. Board of Education, 429 F.Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. 111. 
1977); M.J, v. State, 399 So.2d 996, 998 (Fla. App. 1981); State v. 
Young, 216 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. 1975); Commonwealth v. Cass, 446 
Pa.Super 66 (1995). 
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interest in a public education or he could defend himself and 
expose himself to an unwarranted prosecution. See University 
Disciplinary Process, 1987 Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96, Pages 2152, 
2140-2154. When Mr. Grover deliberately forced Rory into this 
dilemma, the rules of fundamental fairness and due process were 
violated. 
In its ruling, however, the trial court failed to address the 
principal's law enforcement role as it may have affected Mr. 
Grover7s impartiality. Rather, the Court mistakenly identified and 
then limited its decision to the question of whether a school 
administrator can be both an investigator and a disciplinarian. 
Ruling On Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, R. 815 
(see Addendum 4a). Such dual roles are usually, but not always, 
resolved in favor of the disciplinarian. Brewer By Dreyfus v. 
Austin Independent Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 264. However, the 
addition of the law enforcement role to the principal's agenda for 
Rory's disciplinary process provides a more compelling argument 
that Mr. Grover was not impartial• Since the trial court's ruling 
is in error, this Court should reverse and set aside the summary 
judgment ruling. 
f. Rory Atcitty Was Entitled To Enhanced Due Process. 
Mr. Grover should have made the focus of the alleged incident 
an educational matter rather than using it as a vehicle to gather 
criminal evidence to arrest and prosecute the students. Because 
Mr. Grover moved from an educational to a law enforcement focus, 
Rory was entitled to enhanced due process procedures. There was a 
31 
clear law enforcement emphasis and orientation to Mr. Grover's 
investigation. This was also abundantly clear when Mr. Grover 
assisted the police in interrogating and arresting Rory and the 
other students. Confusing law enforcement and education roles 
created a problem that was compounded by Mr. Grover's failure to be 
open and forthcoming about what was happening, what the process of 
the right to be heard really was, and when critical matters, 
including hearings, would occur. 
Enhanced due process was clearly necessary under the 
circumstances of Rory's suspension. In Goss v. Lopezf 419 U.S. 
565, 584, the Court said "[n]or do we put aside the possibility 
that in unusual situations, although involving only a short 
suspension, something more than the rudimentary procedures will be 
required." One such "unusual situation" should be a case where the 
investigation of a crime intermixes with and dominates over the 
administration of education. This is especially important where 
the Districts policy provides no guidance as to how or when law 
enforcement should be involved or how law enforcement involvement 
should inter relate with the suspension process. See School 
Policies
 P R. 415-416, 418, 236. In Gabrilowitz v. Newmon. 582 F.2d 
100, 107 (1st Cir. 1978), the court ruled that a school's failure 
to allow enhanced protection in its disciplinary procedures (i.e., 
the right of the student to an attorney) where related criminal 
proceedings were pending was a violation of due process.16 
16
 Using enhanced due process procedures would also have been 
consistent with the principal's view that the law enforcement 
aspect of the case necessarily restricted his authority as an 
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Enhanced due process, with clear, timely and adequate notice 
of the evidence and the opportunity to be heard, a more formal 
hearing involving the presence of parents, and the confrontation of 
witnesses who supplied inculpatory information against Rory, should 
have occurred. In short, the provision of a meaningful opportunity 
to sort through the facts and to be heard, would have complied with 
Goss and the balancing-of-interests requirement of Matthews v. 
Eldridae. 424 U.S. 319, 335. 
The trial court should have weighed and balanced the competing 
public and private interests at stake in this case. Matthews v. 
Eldridae, 424 U.S. 319, 335; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579; see 
also Prebble v. Broderick, 535 F.2d 605, 616 (10th Cir. 1976); 
Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commission, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 
15, 18. The trial court made no such analysis when ruling that 
defendants were entitled to summary judgment. Ruling On Defendants7 
Motion For Summary Judgment, R. 804-806 (see Addendum 4b). In 
denying plaintiff7s summary judgment motion, the trial court 
concluded that no enhanced due process was due. Ruling On 
Plaintiff7s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, R. 814-816 (see 
Addendum 4a). In so ruling, the Court did not undertake the 
Matthews-Goss analysis, and simply concluded that only the informal 
give-and-take between student and disciplinarian was due and had 
been provided. R. 816. The trial court's failure to weigh and 
balance Rory's interests with those of the school district is a 
fundamental flaw in reasoning, requiring that the judgment be 
educator. See Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 13-14. 
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reversed. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335; Goss v. Lopez, 
419 U.S. 565, 579-580. A proper Matthews-Goss balancing analysis 
would have considered the following matters: 
First, in evaluating the private interests at stake, the right 
to an education is very valuable in the constitutional sense. See 
Point lb, supra. The allegations were serious and affected Rory's 
record of his position as a honor society student and student-body 
officer. McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902, 911-912 (10th Cir. 1977); 
Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F.Supp. 777, 796-797 (W.D. Mich. 1975). 
Added procedural safeguards were necessary because Rory received 
additional penalties beyond suspension, including his exclusion 
from an honors society dinner and other end-of-the year activities. 
Jones v. Latexo Independent School Dist., 499 F.Supp. 223, 239 n.15 
(E.D. Texas 1980); see also Conrad v. University of Washington, 814 
P.2d 1242, 1246-1247 (Wash.App. 1991). 
Second, the extent to which factual issues are in dispute must 
be taken into account in determining whether enhanced due process 
is necessary. McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902, 912 (ruling that one 
factor requiring certain elements of due process is where "disputed 
facts turned largely on the word of individuals"). Although 
allowing Rory to confront his accusers after receiving a full 
explanation of the evidence may have reduced the potential for 
mistakes or misunderstandings, Mr. Grover refused to tell Mr. 
Atcitty the names of the children involved and also withheld other 
pertinent details of the alleged misconduct, including statements 
of the other students. See Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at 
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Pages 15-16, 31-33. This circumstance constitutes a due process 
violation because the District, by virtue of Mr. Grover's assuming 
a law enforcement function, became obligated to use an enhanced, 
more particularized, and more reliable fact-finding procedure than 
what he used. 
Third, in considering the governmental interest involved, the 
right of the school district to effectively administer its 
disciplinary policies in the course of operating its schools, the 
trial court should have taken into account the minimal burden 
additional due process protection would have had on District 
finances or administration. No showing was made that due process 
protection other than something minimal in nature would have 
adversely burdened the District or posed a threat to its obligation 
to maintain order in its schools. Indeed, a proper exchange of 
information about the allegations and affording Rory a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard would not have been time consuming and 
would not have created any burden at all. Such a process would have 
facilitated the District's interests in keeping its students in 
school, a consideration acknowledged by in its policies (e.g. 
School District Policy No. 7320(2), R. 235 & School District Policy 
No. 7332fl)
 r R. 236), and by Goss, where the Court said: "[i]t 
deserves [the student's] interest and the interest of the State if 
his suspension is in fact unwarranted.11 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 
565, 579. 
Rory should have been asked to and provided with a meaningful 
opportunity to state his side of the case after being given a full 
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explanation of the alleged facts and been allowed to confront those 
who made statements against him. This would have been possible if 
the police officer had not dominated the May 16 meeting. 
Rory had an interest in having his parents present as well as 
being heard. District Policy requires that a parent be given an 
opportunity to review a suspension. School District Policy No. 
FHA14J_, R. 340; see also of. United States v. Watts, 513 F.2d 5, 8 
(10th Cir. 1975). The parents7 presence was necessary because the 
investigation, the early encounters with the principal, parent and 
student, and then the May 16 meeting, in combination, made the 
suspension process so adversarial. The parents7 presence was also 
necessary because, as Mr. Grover testified, see Lyman Grover 
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 13-14, parents must be involved when 
students commit crimes. 
Rory therefore had a due process interest in his parents7 
right to protect their child7s education. This interest arises as 
a matter of constitutional law, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 534-535 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 
(1923); Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, 307 
F.Supp. 1328, 1343 (S.D. Texas 1969), and as a matter of Utah law. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 53A-ll-905( 4)-( 5) ; Utah Code Ann. § 53A-11-
906. Certainly, it is a fair inference from the facts that Rory 
had a reasonable expectation that his father would again be called 
in about the matter since Mr. Grover made an deliberate, indeed, 
conscientious effort earlier in the week to do so and had said 
nothing to the contrary when Mr. Atcitty told him not to question 
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his son unless he was present. Mr. Grover involved the parents at 
the beginning and at the end of the process, but would not bring 
them in on the two critical occasions when Rory was alone and 
confronting the principal and the police. This aspect of Rory's 
suspension process is surely constitutionally suspect. 
Rory had the right to have his attorney present, particularly 
in a situation having such serious criminal overtones. See 
Gabrilowitz v. Newmon, 582 F.2d 100, 107. His father had told Mr. 
Grover that Rory was represented by counsel. Lyman Grover 
Deposition,, R. 940, at Page 20. As a result, Mr. Grover called the 
District's superintendent. Id. at 20. Mr. Grover, however, went 
ahead with the May 16th meeting and suspended Rory without allowing 
the student's attorney to be present. Mr. Grover's failure to 
afford Rory the right to counsel was a deliberate move to avoid 
having to undergo an attorney's scrutiny. An attorney should have 
been present because Mr. Grover was acting in a law enforcement 
role and assisting the police. Mr. Grover's apparent bias is 
another reason why an attorney should have been present. See Point 
le, supra. 
In Goss, the Supreme Court said that it would not require that 
a student be afforded the opportunity to secure counsel. Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583. But Goss also held that in "unusual 
situations" more than rudimentary process will be required. IdL at 
584. The circumstances of Rory's suspension demonstrates that this 
is one such situation. 
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POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS A SUMMARY JUDGMENT• 
a. DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Neither Rory nor Mr. Atcitty were given adequate notice of the 
"hearings or the procedures that were involved with the 
investigation and suspension process. See Points led) & ld(l), 
supra. Rory was not given the right to defend himself at a hearing 
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See Points lc(2) 
& ld(2), supra. Other rights pertinent to a proper hearing were 
ignored or diminished. See Points ld(3) & le, supra. Rory should 
have but was not afforded enhanced due process procedures. See 
Point lff supra. The trial court's ruling that Defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment is, therefore, in error. Defendants 
were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the facts, 
taken in a light most favorable to Rory, demonstrate that Rory was 
denied, not provided, basic due process. 
b. THERE ARE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no disputed 
issues of material fact. Rule 56(c); K & T Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 
P.2d 623, 627. This Court determines only whether the trial court 
correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. 
Id. This Court should view all facts and reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Mr. Atcitty. Higgins 
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P. 2d 231, 233. Although Plaintiff and 
Defendants sought summary judgment, alleging that there were no 
23. 
disputed issues of material fact, it became apparent as the record 
was developed during the motion process that there were indeed 
disputed factual issues as to some issues. 
(1) The student's right to be heard in mitigation of 
punishment involves disputed issues of fact. 
During the May 16th meeting in which Rory was suspended and 
arrested, he was not provided an opportunity to speak about matters 
which might have mitigated the punishment he received. Lyman Grover 
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 35-37. See also Point ld(2)f supra.17 
There were issues that could have and should have been discussed in 
mitigation of the punishment.18 Discussing these matters would 
have been consistent with the District's policy of keeping children 
in school, e.g, School District Policy No. 7370, R. 245-246, and 
would certainly have been required as a proper aspect of due 
process. It is anticipated that the District will argue that Rory 
was free to state his side of the story or to discuss anything 
else, including mitigation of punishment, at the May 16th meeting 
with the police. The record, however, is clear that Mr. Grover7s 
purpose for the meeting, and the only thing accomplished there, was 
17
 There was no earlier opportunity to be heard because the 
principal had not decided what action to take. Lyman Grover 
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 28, 18-19. 
18
 There was the right to choose home-schooling, drug 
rehabilitation or a school re-entry program. District Policy No. 
FGAB, R. 657-658; there was the right to avoid additional 
penalties, a particularly significant aspect of the hearing process 
because the principal had the right to recommend additional 
suspension time. District Policy No. FHA3, R. 440; or Rory may have 
simply wanted to discuss with the principal the process for 
clearing his record at some future time so that the incident would 
not affect his status as a student body officer or position as an 
honors society member. 
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the announcement that the students were suspended. While the 
meeting certainly assisted the police in interrogating and then 
arresting Rory and the others, no room was made available for Rory 
to discuss his punishment with the principal. 
Following his suspension from school and arrest by the police, 
Rory was allowed to remain on school premises while his father was 
called to the school. Mr. Atcitty went to the school and had a 
brief conversation with the principal. He was provided with a fait 
accompli in that he was given a form with the suspension decision 
and punishment already marked in, Plaintiffs7 Summary Judgment 
Exhibit 6, Student Behavior Referral, R. 419, was not told that, at 
least, some matters relating to mitigation of punishment could 
remain open for further discussion and decision, Roger Atcitty Sr. 
Deposition, R. 939, at Pages 11-12; Fn.18., supra, and simply chose 
to leave in the face of Mr. Grover's "take or leave it" attitude.19 
The District's version of what happened at this last "meeting" 
is substantially different. The principal claims that Mr. Atcitty 
came and went quickly, Lyman Grover Depositionf R. 940, at Pages 
40-42, that the father acted brusquely and refused to talk about 
anything, Id.; see also Lyman Grover Affidavit, R. 517-518, f 13, 
and, apparently contradicting himself, later said that Mr. Atcitty 
did not talk with him about anything of substance other than drug 
19
 Mr. Grover had assumed the same attitude from the very 
beginning when he told Mr. Atcitty earlier in the week that he 
would make no accommodation concerning Rory's situation. Lyman 
Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 17. There was certainly 
sufficient time to tell Mr. Atcitty that there were matters in 
mitigation and to discuss them if the principal chose to do so. 
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rehabilitation. See Id.20 Significantly, even the District's 
version of the facts reveal that the principal did not inform 
either Rory or Mr. Atcitty that Rory had the right to be heard in 
mitigation of punishment or even what matters were apparently open 
for discussion.21 And significantly, Mr. Grover did admit that 
during the May 16 meeting he did not tell the students about any 
post-suspension services or home-schooling. Lyman Grover 
Depositionr R. 940, at Page 36. 
The trial court itself found there to be disputed issues of 
fact after considering Plaintiff's summary judgment argument about 
the question of mitigation of punishment. See Ruling On Plaintiff's 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgmentf R. 815-816.22 In opposing 
Defendants' proposed summary judgment order, Plaintiff brought the 
effect of the Court's ruling (that there apparently was a need to 
20
 Mr. Grover acknowledged that the school had no such program, 
but referred students to Social Services. However, he made no 
mention of any of this to Mr. Atcitty or to Rory. See Id. at Pages 
41-43. 
21
 Although District policy provides that the suspension notice 
should include the date, time and place for the parent to meet with 
the principal to discuss the suspension, see Policy No. FHA4fd,l , R. 
340, Mr. Grover did not inform Mr. Atcitty of these matters. See 
Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 40-43. The form did not 
contain this information. In his affidavit, Mr. Grover says that 
he tried to talk about the term of suspension, but said nothing 
about other important matters. See Lyman Grover Affidavit, R. 518. 
The form notice is also silent about any such other matters. See R. 
420. 
22 iirphe court also finds that in the context of Plaintiff's 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment there is a genuine issue of 
material fact which precludes summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff on the issue of whether Plaintiff was given an 
opportunity to be heard with regard to the alleged conduct of the 
Plaintiff and in mitigation of punishment." See Addendum 4a. 
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try this disputed factual issue) to the Court's attention. R. 867-
869. The trial court, however, ignored this incongruity when it 
overruled the objection, R. 880-883, 897-902, and when it proceeded 
to sign the proposed judgment. R. 884-896. Nevertheless, there 
remains disputed factual issues as to whether Rory was properly 
afforded his right to mitigate the punishment that he received. 
(2) Whether the principal was an impartial disciplinarian 
is a disputed issue of fact. 
There is no doubt that Mr. Grover considered Rory's discipline 
to be a police matter, Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 
37, 53-54, as did the Plaintiffs. Roger Atcitty Sr. Deposition, R. 
939, at Pages 709. Mr. Grover collected evidence with the goal of 
providing it to law enforcement, Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, 
at Pages 37, 53-54, and provided important assistance to the police 
by compelling the students to go to his office where they could be 
interrogated and arrested. Id. at 31-33, 35-38, 39. The clear 
meaning of Mr. Grover's conduct is that he was functioning as a 
police agent and that the administration of school policy and 
discipline was merely incidental to that role. Mr. Grover7s 
voluntary assumption of a law enforcement role contrasts with the 
District's view that the principal was simply an educator 
disciplining a student, that his not calling the police until the 
end of his investigation demonstrates he was not a police agent, 
and that he did nothing more than call in the police as required by 
school policy. The resolution of this issue required the trial 
court to defer fact finding until trial. 
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(3) Whether the student was provided notice of 
the rules and procedures and time and place of hearing 
involve disputed issues of fact. 
The District was obligated to provide adequate notice of the 
rules of conduct and the procedures involved in the disciplinary 
process. Utah Code Ann. § 53A-ll-903(2); see also School District 
Policy No. FHAf R. 334. Whether Mr. Atcitty was provided adequate 
notice of the rules involves disputed issues of fact. Mr. Atcitty 
repeatedly asked for a hearing and an explanation of the process 
involved, which was never provided. Roger Atcitty Sr. Deposition, 
R. 939, at Pages 24, 26. Mr. Grover admitted he does not discuss 
suspension procedures until a decision has been made. Lyman Grover 
Depositionf R. 940, at Page 28. Mr. Grover never did provide Rory 
or his father with this information. In contrast, the District 
claimed that the principal tried several different times to explain 
board procedure and policies. See Defendants' Memorandum In 
Opposition, R. 587.23 Although this differing view of the facts 
may be resolved in Plaintiff7s favor when considering whether 
summary judgment for the Defendants was appropriate, it does 
demonstrate that a factual dispute exists on this question. 
(4) The Lyman Grover Affidavit. 
In an attempt to bolster Defendants' claim to summary judgment 
and to frustrate Plaintiff's Motion, Mr. Grover submitted an 
affidavit. See Lyman Grover Affidavit, R. 513-519. This affidavit 
23
 The District referenced Mr. Grover's affidavit, R. 513-519, 
at f 13; Mr. Grover's deposition, R. 940, at Pages 12-13, 15-16, 
23-25, 39-42; Mr. Atcitty's deposition, R. 939, at Pages 4-12; and 
Rory's Deposition, R. 941, at Pages 25-27, 29-32. 
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contradicted his sworn deposition testimony. In regards to the May 
16th meeting between Mr. Atcitty and Mr. Grover, he describes in 
his deposition testimony that a conversation occurred between them. 
See Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 40-42. In his 
affidavit, he makes the flat assertion that Roger Atcitty ". . . 
refused to speak with me." Lyman Grover Affidavit, R. 517-518. If 
the trial court had accepted this latter statement as an absolute 
fact, this undoubtedly affected Rory's contention that he, through 
his parent, was not afforded an adeguate and timely opportunity to 
be heard in regards to the suspension. In regards to the police 
involvement, Mr. Grover's deposition testimony clearly reveals that 
he was engaged in a law enforcement activity at the outset (May 
14). At that time, he interviewed students and drafted a report 
for the police. This stands in sharp contrast with his affidavit 
testimony wherein he states that the incident did not become a 
police matter until after the suspension process had concluded. Id. 
at R. 515-516.24 Clearly, the affidavit statements were designed 
to assist Defendants more than does the deposition testimony. 
The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion to strike the 
affidavit. R. 884-892. This was an improper exercise of the trial 
court's discretion. The affidavit violated summary judgment 
24
 It also contrasts with what actually happened when the 
students were suspended on May 16. It is clear that as a part of 
the suspension process Mr. Grover summoned all students to his 
office and announced his decision. At the same time, the meeting 
served the purpose of allowing the officer to review Mr. Grover's 
earlier report and the statements of the children, served the 
purpose of allowing the officer to interrogate the children, and 
enabled the officer to arrest them. 
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standards because Mr. Grover did not allege facts showing a 
substantial likelihood that his deposition testimony was in error, 
nor did he allege an adequate explanation for the contradictory 
statements. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173; Gaw v. State, 798 
P. 2d 1130, 1140-1141. The net effect of this ruling was self-
defeating because it created factual disputes making the trial 
court's granting of summary judgment improper. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT 
The parties concluded discovery at the end of December, 1996 
and a trial was set for May 28-29, 1997. Plaintiff filed a Motion 
for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint 
presented no new causes of action, but did provide specific 
allegations describing the due process claim. The proposed Amended 
Complaint set forth facts which were then apparent as a result of 
discovery. The Amended Complaint also clarified the remedy sought 
by Plaintiff in this action. Plaintiff requested the amendment to 
his complaint on March 6, 1997. No pretrial or other order 
prohibited an amendment. No pretrial or other order limited the 
nature of the issues, or the claims, in the case. The trial court 
denied Rory the right to file an amended complaint. R. 895-896. The 
trial court also would not consider matters raised in the proposed 
amended complaint for purposes of the pending summary judgment 
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motions.25 
Rule 15 (a), Ut. R. Civ. P., allows a party to amend a 
complaint with approval of the Court. One common reason to amend 
a complaint is to bring Plaintiff's allegations as refined by the 
discovery process into line with the evidence which will be before 
the Court at trial. See Rule 15 (b) . The rule is liberally applied, 
and the trial court therefore has considerable discretion in 
granting a request to amend. Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P. 2d 86, 91 
(Utah 1963); Timm v. Dewsnupr 851 P.2d 1178; see also Thompson v. 
Superior Fireplace Co., 931 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1991); Cooper 
v. Shumwav, 780 F.2d 27, 29 (10th Cir. 1985). Requests to amend 
which simply refine a parties7 claim and specify the issues as they 
are apparent following discovery are usually granted. Indeed, 
complaints are routinely amended even after trial to conform to the 
evidence. See Rule 15(b).26 
Although the District objected to the proposed amendment on 
the basis that it added new claims, no new claims were in fact 
raised. The facts only revolved around due process issues arising 
from a Rory's suspension from school. Plaintiff's initial 
complaint asserted a due process claim in general terms. Since 
25
 The issues which were omitted from the Court's consideration 
were (1) Board policies were vague and ambiguous, (2) Mr. Lyman was 
not impartial, and (3) Rory was deprived of a liberty interest. See 
Ruling On Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgmentr R. 814-
815. 
26
 The case evidently relied upon by the trial court, Swift 
Stop. Inc. v. Wight, 845 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1992) is not 
applicable because the parties in Swift were attempting to add new 
claims 18 months after the filing of the initial complaint, Id. at 
253-254. 
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there is only a basic notice-pleading requirement in Section 1983 
cases, Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 113 S.Ct. 1160 (1993), Rory 
was entitled to raise any and all factual issues which bear on the 
due process claim. 
The question posed by the involvement of law enforcement in 
the suspension process and the involvement of the principal with 
law enforcement pertains to the issue of whether Rory was provided 
an adequate opportunity to be heard. The question of whether the 
student had an adequate and timely opportunity to tell his side of 
the story is not a new claim, but was raised in the original 
complaint. A prerequisite to the opportunity to be heard is the 
question of adequate notice, also nothing new. The law enforcement 
issues apply to the question of whether the disciplinarian was 
impartial and whether basic due process protection should have been 
enhanced. No new claims are added to this case by simply 
describing different aspects of the same matter in an amended 
complaint. The question of the vagueness of District suspension 
policies and procedures is likewise not a new claim. It pertains 
to the question of whether Rory had notice of his rights and 
responsibilities as Mr. Grover's investigation and suspension 
process went forward over a week's time. His uncertainty and the 
uncertainty of Mr. Atcitty as to the rules and as to how they 
should deal with the principal prevented Rory from telling his side 
of the story until it was too late to do so in a meaningful manner. 
See Point 1, supra. 
The Defendants cannot claim they were surprised and unprepared 
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as a result of the proposed amendments. The issues raised in the 
proposed amended complaint were apparent from the allegations made 
in the initial complaint. The issues are also apparent from the 
depositions taken during discovery long before the proposed 
amendments, particularly the deposition of Mr. Grover. 
There are many valid reasons why parties amend their 
complaint. See Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Civil 2d, § 1471 (construing the federal rule identical 
to Utah's). These purposes were reflected in Plaintiff's proposed 
Amended Complaint. An amendment under Rule 15(a) is appropriate 
when a plaintiff seeks a different remedy. U.S. v. Hougham, 364 
U.S. 310 (1960). An amendment is appropriate to modify previously 
alleged claims. Young v. Seabord Corp., 360 F.Supp. 490, 497 (D. 
Utah 1973). An amended complaint may also state additional claims. 
Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943); Pol in v. Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc., 511 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff's 
proposed complaint satisfies the standards of the rule. 
There was not an unreasonable delay in the filing of the 
motion. The amendment simply reflects the facts developed in 
discovery which had been completed in late December, 1996. 
Defendants have not been prejudiced since the issues raised in the 
amended complaint were apparent from the discovery, particularly 
from the deposition testimony. 
The trial court's refusal to allow the amended complaint 
prevent important issues from being considered in the summary 
judgment process. Prohibition of the amendment also improperly 
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restricted the scope of Rory's due process claim. Since an 
amendment should "...be freely given when justice so requires", 
Rule 15(a), the trial court's refusal to allow what should have 
been a routine amendment constitutes an abuse of discretion• 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the judgment and order of the trial 
court. The Court should order the trial court to enter a partial 
judgment for Rory on his claim that he was suspended from school 
without due process, reserving the question of remedy for trial. 
In the alternative, this Court should remand the case for trial 
proceedings and allow plaintiff to proceed on his amended 
complaint. 
Eric P. Swenson 
Rosalie Reilly 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Eric P. Swenson, attorney for Appellant, hereby certifies that 
he did personally deliver two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief to the attorneys for Appellees at the law offices 
of Anderson and Anderson, L. Robert Anderson and Daniel G. 
Anderson, Monticello, Utah, this 16th day of March, 1998. 
Eric P. Swenson 
Attorney for Appellant 
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AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1 ICitizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4 | Public debt not (o be questioned — Debts of 
protection | tbe Confederacy and claims not 
2. (Representatives — Povvei to ieduce ap- to be paid ] 
pomtment | 5 (Pouei to enforce amendment.] 
3. |Disqualification to hold office I 
Section 1. ICitizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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A m e n d XIV, § 4 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incuired for payment of pensions and bounties for sei vices in 
suppressing msunection oi rebellion, shall not be questioned But neither the 
United States noi any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
clined m aid of msunection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss 01 emancipation of an\ slave, but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article 
History: Proposed b\ Congiess on June 16 
1866 declared to have been ratified b> three 
fourths of all the states on July 28 1868 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section Section 
1 [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not 2 IPower to enforce amendment ] 
to disqualify 1 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to 
disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of seivitude 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congiess shall have power to enfoice this aiticle by appropriate legisla-
tion 
History: Proposed b\ Congiess on tebiuan more than three fourths of all the states on 
27, 1869, declared to have been ratified b> March 30, 1870 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax.] 
The Congiess shall have powei to lav and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source denved, without apportionment among the several States, 
and without legaid to any census or enumeration 
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involved in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc v Hennejord, 305 
U S 434 (1939) The taxpayer was a Washington cor-
poration doing business there and shipping fruit from 
Washington to places of sale in the various States and 
m foreign countries The Court held the tax as applied, 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause 
"Here the tax measured by the entire volume of 
the interstate commerce in which appellant par-
ticipates is not apportioned to its activities within 
the state If Washington is free to exact such a 
tax, other states to which the commerce extends 
may ^ i th equal right lay a tax similarly measured 
for the privilege of conducting within their respec-
tive territorial limits the activities there which con-
tribute to the service The present tax though 
nominally local thus m its practical operation dis-
criminates against interstate commerce, since it 
imposes upon it merelv because interstate commerce 
is being done the risk of a multiple burden to which 
local commerce is not exposed ' Id , at 439 
In the instant case as in Ficklen \ Shelby County 
Taxing District 145 IT S 1 (1892)," the tax is on the 
gross receipt* from sales made to a local consumer, v hich 
may have some impact on commerce Yet as we said m 
Gwin White & Prince, supra at 440, in describing the tax 
in Ficklen it is "apportioned exactly to the activities 
taxed " all of \\hich are intrastate 
Affirmed 
2
 In that case the taxpayers did business as brokers in Tennessee 
The-\ solicited local customers and sent their orders to out-of-state 
\endors who shipped directl) to the purchaser Tennessee le\ied a 
tax on their gross commissions The Court in distinguishing the 
drummer' cases illustrated b> Robbins \ Shelby County Taxing Dis-
trict 120 tJ S 489 (1887) stated tint in Ficklen Tennessee did not 
t i \ more than it* own internal commerce 
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G O S S E T A L v LOPEZ ETAL 
APPEAL FROM T H E UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR T H E 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
No 73-898 Argued October 16, 1974—Decided January 22, 1975 
Appellee Ohio public high school students who had been suspended 
from school for misconduct for up to 10 days without a hear-
ing, brought a class action against appellant school officials seeking 
a declaration that the Ohio statute permitting such suspensions was 
unconstitutional and an order enjoining the officials to remove the 
references to the suspensions from the student5' records A three-
ludge District Court declared that appellees were denied due 
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
they were "suspended without hearing prior to suspension or 
withm a reasonable time thereafter " and that the statute and 
implementing regulations were unconstitutional and granted the 
requested injunction Held 
1 Students facing temporary suspension from a public school 
have property and hbertv interests that qualify for protection 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Pp 572-576 
(a) Having chosen to extend the right to an education to 
people of appellees' class generalh Ohio may not withdraw that 
right on grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair proce-
dures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred, and 
must recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public 
education as a property interest that is protected by the Due 
Process Clause, and that ma\ not be taken iwa> for misconduct 
without observing minimum procedures required by that Clause 
Pp 573-574 
(b) Since misconduct charges if sustained and recorded could 
seriously damage the students' reputation as well as interfere with 
later educational and employment opportunities, the State's 
claimed nght to determine unilateral^ and without process 
whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides with 
the Due Process Clause's prohibition against arbitrary depriva-
tion of liberty Pp 574-575 
(c) A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis and 
ma> not be imposed in complete disregard of the Due Process 
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Clause. Neither the property interest in educational benefits 
temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation is so 
insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed 
by any procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary. 
Pp. 575-576. 
2. Due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 
days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of 
the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation 
of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present 
his version. Generally, notice and hearing should precede the 
student's removal from school, since the hearing may almost 
immediately follow the misconduct, but if prior notice and hearing 
are not feasible, as where the student's presence endangers persons 
or property or threatens disruption of the academic process, thus 
justifying immediate removal from school, the necessary notice 
and hearing should follow as soon as practicable. Pp. 577-584. 
372 F. Supp. 1279, affirmed. 
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, 
BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ , joined. POWELL, J., filed 
a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN and 
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 584. 
Thomas A. Bustin argued the cause for appellants. 
With him on the briefs were James / . Hughes, Jr., Robert 
A. Bell, and Patrick M. McGrath. 
Peter D. Roos argued the cause for appellees. With 
him on the brief were Denis Murphy and Kenneth C. 
Cur tin.* 
*John F. Lewis filed a brief for the Buckeye Association of School 
Administrators et al. as arnici curiae urging reversal. 
Briefs of amid curiae urging affirmance were filed by David 
Bonderman, Peter Van A\ Lockwood, Paul L. Tractenberg, David 
Rubin, and W. William Hodes for the National Committee for Citi-
zens in Education et a l ; by Alan H. Levine, Melvin L. Wulj, and 
Joel M. Gora for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Robert H. 
Kapp, R. Stephen Browning, and Nathaniel R. Jones for the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People et a l ; 
and by Marian Wright Edelman for the Children's Defense Fund of 
the Washington Research Project, Inc., et al. 
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M R . JUSTICE'WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This appeal by various administrators of the Columbus, 
Ohio, Public School System (CPSS) challenges the 
judgment of a three-judge federal court, declaring that 
appellees—various high school students in the CPSS— 
were denied due process of law contrary to the command 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in that they were tem-
porarily suspended from their high schools without a 
hearing either prior to suspension or within a reasonable 
time thereafter, and enjoining the administrators to 
remove all references to such suspensions from the stu-
dents' records. 
I 
Ohio law, Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.64 (1972), provides for 
free education to all children between the ages of six and 
21. Section 3313.66 of the Code empowers the principal 
of an Ohio public school to suspend a pupil for miscon-
duct for up to 10 days or to expel him. In either case, he 
must notify the student's parents within 24 hours 
and state the reasons for his action. A pupil who is ex-
pelled, or his parents, may appeal the decision to the 
Board of Education and in connection therewith shall be 
permitted to be heard at the board meeting. The Board 
may reinstate the pupil following the hearing. No sim-
ilar procedure is provided in § 3313.66 or any other pro-
vision of state law for a suspended student. Aside from 
a regulation tracking the statute, at the time of the impo-
sition of the suspensions in this case the CPSS itself had 
not issued any written procedure applicable to sus-
pensions.1 Nor, so far as the record reflects, had any of 
1
 At the time of the events involved in this case, the only ad-
ministrative regulation on this subject was § 1010.04 of the Admin-
istrative Guide of the Columbus Public Schools which provided: 
"Pupils may be suspended or expelled from school in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 3313.66 of the Revised Code." Subse-
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the individual high schools involved in this case.2 Each, 
however, had formally or informally described the con-
duct for which suspension could be imposed. 
The nine named appellees, each of whom alleged that 
he or she had been suspended from public high school in 
Columbus for up to 10 davs without a hearing pursuant 
to § 3313 66 filed an action under 42 U S C § 1983 
against the Columbus Board of Education and various 
administrators of the CPSS The complaint sought a 
quent to the e\enU imohed in this lawsuit the Department of Pupil 
Personnel of the CPSS issued three memoranda relating to suspension 
procedure^ dated August 16 1971, Februan 21, 1973, and Julj 10, 
1973, respectneh The first two are substantially similar to each 
other and require no factfinding hearing at am time in connection 
with a suspension The third which was apparently m effect when 
this case was argued places upon the principal the obligation to 
"investigate" "before commencing suspension procedures", and 
pro\ ides as part of the procedures that the principal shall discuss the 
case with the pupil so that the pupil ma-\ "be heard with respect to 
the alleged offense/' unless the pupil is "unavailable" for such a 
discussion or "unwilling" to participate in it The suspensions m-
\olved m this case occurred, and records thereof were made, prior 
to the effectne date of these memoranda The District 
Court's judgment, including its expunction order, turns on the pro-
priety of the procedures existing at the time the suspensions were 
ordered and bv which the}' were imposed 
2
 According to the testimom of Phillip Fulton, the principal of one 
of the high schools invoked in this case, there was an informal 
procedure applicable at the Marion-Franklin High School It pro-
vided that in the routine case of misconduct, occurring in the pres-
ence of a teacher, the teacher would describe the misconduct on a 
form provided for that purpose and would send the student, with 
the form, to the principal's office There, the principal would 
obtain the student's version of the story, and, if it conflicted with the 
teacher's written version, would send for the teacher to obtain the 
teacher's oral version—apparentlv in the presence of the student 
Mr Fulton testified that if a discrepant still existed, the teacher's 
version would be believed and the principal would arrive at a dis-
ciphnan decision based on it 
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declaration that § 3313.66 was unconstitutional in that it 
permitted public school administrators to deprive plain-
tiffs of their rights to an education without a hearing of 
any kind, in violation of the procedural due process com-
ponent of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also sought to 
enjoin the public school officials from issuing future sus-
pensions pursuant to § 3313.66 and to require them to 
remove references to the past suspensions from the 
records of the students in question.3 
The proof below established that the suspensions 
arose out of a period of widespread student unrest 
in the CPSS during February and March 1971. 
Six of the named plaintiffs, Rudolph Sutton, Tyrone 
Washington, Susan Cooper, Deborah Fox, Clarence Byars, 
and Bruce Harris, were students at the Marion-Franklin 
High School and were each suspended for 10 days4 on 
account of disruptive or disobedient conduct committed 
in the presence of the school administrator who ordered 
the suspension One of these, Tyrone Washington, was 
among a group of students demonstrating in the school 
auditorium while a class was being conducted there. He 
was ordered by the school principal to leave, refused 
3
 The plaintiffs sought to bring the action on behalf of all students 
of the Columbus Public Schools suspended on or after February 
1971, and a class action was declared accordingly Since the com-
plaint sought to restram the "enforcement" and "operation" of a 
state statute "by restraining the action of any officer of such state 
in the enforcement or execution of such statute," a three-judge court 
was requested pursuant to 28 U S C §2281 and convened The 
students also alleged that the conduct for which they could be sus-
pended was not adequately defined by Ohio law This vagueness 
and overbreadth argument was rejected by the court below and the 
students have not appealed from this part of the court's decision 
4
 Fox was given two separate 10-day suspensions for misconduct 
occurring on two separate occasions—the second following immedi-
ately upon her return to school In addition to his suspension, Sut-
ton was transferred to another school 
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to do so, and was suspended Rudolph Sutton, in the 
presence of the principal, physically attacked a police 
officer who was attempting to remove Tyrone Washington 
from the auditorium He was immediately suspended 
The other four Marion-Franklin students were suspended 
for similar conduct None was given a hearing to de-
termine the operative facts underlying the suspension, 
but each, together with his or her parents, was offered the 
opportunity to attend a conference, subsequent to the 
effective date of the suspension to discuss the student's 
future 
Two named plaintiffs, Dwight Lopez and Betty Crome, 
were students at the Central High School and McGuffey 
Junior High School respectively The former was sus-
pended m connection with a disturbance m the lunch-
room which involved some physical damage to school 
property 5 Lopez testified that at least 75 other students 
were suspended from his school on the same day He also 
testified below that he was not a party to the destructive 
conduct but was instead an innocent bystander Be-
cause no one from the school testified with regard to this 
incident, there is no evidence in the record indicating 
the official basis for concluding otherwise Lopez never 
had a hearing 
Betty Crome was present at a demonstration at a high 
school other than the one she was attending There 
she was arrested together with others taken to the police 
station and released without being formally charged 
Before she went to school on the following day, she was 
*• Lopez was actualh absent from school following his suspension 
for over 20 davs This seems to have occurred because of a mis-
understanding as to the length of the suspension A letter sent to 
Lopez after he had been out for over 10 da>s purports to assume 
that being over compulsory school age, he was voluntarily staying 
awa\ Upon asserting that this was not the case, Lopez was trans-
ferred to another school 
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notified that she had been suspended for a 10-day period 
Because no one from the school testified with respect to 
this incident, the record does not disclose how the Mc-
Guffey Junior High School principal went about making 
the decision to suspend Crome, nor does it disclose 
on what information the decision was based It is clear 
from the record that no hearing was ever held 
There was no testimony with respect to the suspension 
of the ninth named plaintiff, Carl Smith The school 
files were also silent as to his suspension, although as to 
some, but not all, of the other named plaintiffs the files 
contained either direct references to their suspensions 
or copies of letters sent to their parents advising them 
of the suspension 
On the basis of this evidence the three-judge court 
declared that plaintiffs were denied due process of law 
because they were "suspended without hearing prior to 
suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter/' and 
that Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3313 66 (1972) and regula-
tions issued pursuant thereto were unconstitutional in 
permitting such suspensionsc It was ordered that all 
references to plaintiffs' suspensions be removed from 
school files 
Although not imposing upon the Ohio school adminis-
trators any particular disciplinary procedures and leaving 
them "free to adopt regulations providing for fair suspen-
sion procedures which are consonant with the educational 
goals of their schools and reflective of the characteristics 
of their school and locality/' the District Court declared 
6
 In its judgment, the court stated that the statute is unconstitu-
tional in that it provides for suspension without first affording 
the student due process of law " (Emphasis supplied ) However, the 
language of the judgment must be read m light of the language m 
the opmion which expressly contemplates that under some circum-
stances students may properh be removed from school before a 
hearmg is held so long as the hearing follows promptly 
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that there were "minimum requirements of notice and 
a hearing prior to suspension, except in emergency situa-
tions." In explication, the court stated that relevant 
case authority would: (1) permit "[ijmmediate removal 
of a student whose conduct disrupts the academic at-
mosphere of the school, endangers fellow students, teach-
ers or school officials, or damages property"; (2) require 
notice of suspension proceedings to be sent to the stu-
dent's parents within 24 hours of the decision to conduct 
them; and (3) require a hearing to be held, with the stu-
dent present, within 72 hours of his removal. Finally, 
the court stated that, with respect to the nature of the 
hearing, the relevant cases required that statements in 
support of the charge be produced, that the student and 
others be permitted to make statements in defense or 
mitigation, and that the school need not permit attend-
ance by counsel. 
The defendant school administrators have appealed 
the three-judge court's decision. Because the order below 
granted plaintiffs' request for an injunction—ordering de-
fendants to expunge their records—this Court has juris-
diction of the appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253. 
We affirm. 
II 
At the outset, appellants contend that because there is 
no constitutional right to an education at public expense, 
the Due Process Clause does not protect against ex-
pulsions from the public school system. This position 
misconceives the nature of the issue and is refuted by 
prior decisions. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids 
the State to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. Protected interests in prop-
erty are normally "not created by the Constitution. 
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined" 
by an independent source such as state statutes or rules 
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entitling the citizen to certain benefits. Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972). 
Accordingly, a state employee who under state law, 
or rules promulgated by state officials, has a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to continued employment absent 
sufficient cause for discharge may demand the procedural 
protections of due process. Connell v. Higginbotham, 
403 U. S. 207 (1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 
183, 191-192 (1952); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 
164 (POWELL, J., concurring), 171 (WHITE, J., concurring 
and dissenting) (1974). So may welfare recipients 
who have statutory rights to welfare as long as they 
maintain the specified qualifications. Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U. S. 254 (1970). Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 
(1972), applied the limitations of the Due Process Clause 
to governmental decisions to revoke parole, although a 
parolee has no constitutional right to that status. In 
like vein was Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), 
where the procedural protections of the Due Process 
Clause were triggered by official cancellation of a pris-
oner's good-time credits accumulated under state law, 
although those benefits were not mandated by the 
Constitution. 
Here, on the basis of state law, appellees plainly had 
legitimate claims of entitlement to a public education. 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3313.48 and 3313.64 (1972 and 
Supp. 1973) direct local authorities to provide a free edu-
cation to all residents between five and 21 years of age, 
and a compulsory-attendance law requires attendance 
for a school year of not less than 32 weeks. Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. §3321.04 (1972). It is true that §3313.66 
of the Code permits school principals to suspend 
students for up to 10 days; but suspensions may 
not be imposed without any grounds whatsoever. All 
of the schools had their own rules specifying the 
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grounds for expulsion or suspension. Having chosen to 
extend the right to an education to people of appellees' 
class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on 
grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair pro-
cedures to determine whether the misconduct has oc-
curred. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 164 (POWELL, J., 
concurring), 171 ( W H I T E , J., concurring and dissenting), 
206 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated 
to establish and maintain a public school system, it has 
nevertheless done so and has required its children to at-
tend. Those young people do not "shed their consti-
tutional rights" at the schoolhouse door. Tinker v. 
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). "The 
Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, 
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its 
creatures—Boards of Education not excepted." West 
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 
637 (1943). The authority possessed by the State to 
prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools 
although concededlv very broad, must be exercised con-
sistently with constitutional safeguards. Among other 
things the State is constrained to recognize a student's 
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property 
interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause 
and which may not be taken away for misconduct with-
out adherence to the minimum procedures required by 
that Clause. 
The Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary depriva-
tions of liberty. "Where a person's good name, repu-
tation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the 
government is doing to him," the minimal requirements 
of the Clause must be satisfied. Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau, 400 U. S. 433, 437 (1971); Board of Regents v. 
Roth, supra, at 573. School authorities here suspended 
appellees from school for periods of up to 10 days 
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based on charges of misconduct. If sustained and re-
corded, those charges could seriously damage the students' 
standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well 
as interfere with later opportunities for higher education 
and employment.7 I t is apparent that the claimed right 
of the State to determine unilaterally and without process 
whether that misconduct has occurred immediately col-
lides with the requirements of the Constitution. 
Appellants proceed to argue that even if there is a 
right to a public education protected by the Due Process 
Clause generally, the Clause comes into play only when 
the State subjects a student to a "severe detriment or 
grievous loss." The loss of 10 days, it is said, is neither 
severe nor grievous and the Due Process Clause is there-
fore of no relevance. Appellants' argument is again re-
futed by our prior decisions; for in determining "whether 
due process requirements apply in the first place, we must 
look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest 
7
 Appellees assert in their brief that four of 12 randomly selected 
Ohio colleges specificalh inquire of the high school of every applicant 
for admission whether the applicant has ever been suspended Brief 
for Appellees 34-35 and n 40 Appellees also contend that many 
employers request similar information Ibid 
Congress has recently enacted legislation limiting access to infor-
mation contained in the files of a school receiving federal funds 
Section 513 of the Education Amendments of 1974, Pub L 93-380, 
88 Stat 571, 20 U S C § 1232g (1970 ed , Supp IV), adding §438 
to the General Education Provisions Act That section would pre-
clude release of "verified reports of serious or recurrent behavior 
patterns" to employers without written consent of the student's 
parents While subsection (b)(1)(B) permits release of such in-
formation to "other schools in which the student intends to 
enroll," it does so only upon condition that the parent be advised 
of the release of the information and be given an opportunity at 
a heanng to challenge the content of the information to insure 
against inclusion of inaccurate or misleading information The stat-
ute does not expressly state whether the parent can contest the under-
lying basis for a suspension, the fact of which is contained in the 
student's school record. 
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at stake." Board oj Regents v. Roth, supra, at 570-571. 
Appellees were excluded from school only temporarily, it 
is true, but the length and consequent severity of a depri-
vation, while another factor to weigh in determining the 
appropriate form of hearing, "is not decisive of the basic 
right" to a hearing of some kind. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U. S. 67, 86 (1972). The Court's view has been that as 
long as a property deprivation is not de minimis, its grav-
ity is irrelevant to the question whether account must be 
taken of the Due Process Clause. Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., con-
curring) ; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 378-379 
(1971); Board oj Regents v. Roth, supra, at 570 n. 8. 
A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis in 
our view and may not be imposed in complete disregard 
of the Due Process Clause. 
A short suspension is, of course, a far milder deprivation 
than expulsion. But, "education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments," 
Brown v. Board oj Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954), 
and the total exclusion from the educational process for 
more than a trivial period, and certainly if the suspension 
is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the sus-
pended child. Neither the property interest in educa-
tional benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest 
in reputation, which is also implicated, is so insubstantial 
that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any 
procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.8 
8
 Since the landmark decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Dixon v. Alabama State Board oj Education, 294 
F. 2d 150, cert, denied, 368 U. S. 930 (1961), the lower federal 
courts have uniformly held the Due Process Clause applicable to de-
cisions made by tax-supported educational institutions to remove a 
student from the institution long enough for the removal to be 
classified as an expulsion. Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F. 2d 201, 211 
(CA2 1972); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F. 2d 807, 812 (CA2 1967); 
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III 
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the 
question remains what process is due." Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U. S., at 481. We turn to that question, fully 
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F. 2d 1077, 
1089 (CA8 1969), cert, denied, 398 U. S. 965 (1970); 
Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (ED Mich. 
1969); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889 (ED 111. 1970); 
Fielder v. Board of Education of School District of Winnebago, Neb., 
346 F. Supp. 722, 729 (Neb. 1972); DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. 
Supp. 70, 74 (Conn. 1972); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 
994 (WD Wis. 1968), aff'd, 418 F. 2d 163 (CA7 1969); Stricklin v. 
Regents of University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp.. 416, 420 (WD Wis. 
1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F. 2d 1257 (CA7 1970); Buck v. Carter, 
308 F. Supp. 1246 (WD Wis. 1970); General Order on Judicial 
Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Disci-
pline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F. R. D. 
133, 147-148 (WD Mo. 1968) (en banc). The lower courts have been 
less uniform, however, on the question whether removal from school 
for some shorter period may ever be so trivial a deprivation as to 
require no process, and, if so, how short the removal must be to 
qualify. Courts of Appeals have held or assumed the Due Process 
Clause applicable to long suspensions, Pervis v. LaMarque Ind. 
School Dist., 466 F. 2d 1054 (CA5 1972); to indefinite suspensions, 
Sullivan v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 475 F. 2d 1071 (CA5), 
cert, denied, 414 U. S. 1032 (1973); to the addition of a 30-day 
suspension to a 10-day suspension, Williams v. Dade County School 
Board, 441 F. 2d 299 (CA5 1971); to a 10-day suspension, Black Stu-
dents of North Fort Myers Jr.-Sr. High School v. Williams, 470 F. 2d 
957 (CA5 1972); to "mild" suspensions, Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 
(CA2 1971), and Tate v. Board of Education, 453 F. 2d 975 (CA8 
1972); and to a three-day suspension, Shanley v. Northeast Ind. 
School Dist., Bexar County, Texas, 462 F. 2d 960, 967 n. 4 (CA5 
1972); but inapplicable to a seven-day suspension, Linwood v. Board 
of Ed. of City of Peoria, 463 F. 2d 763 (CA7), cert, denied, 
409 U . S . 1027 (1972); to a three-day suspension, Dunn v. Tyler 
Ind. School Dist., 460 F. 2d 137 (CA5 1972); to a suspension for 
not "more than a few days," Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish 
School Board, 472 F. 2d 438 (CA5 1973); and to all suspensions no 
matter how short, Black Coalition v. Portland School District No. 1, 
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realizing as our cases regularly do that the interpretation 
and application of the Due Process Clause are intensely 
practical matters and that "[t]he very nature of due 
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures uni-
versally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafe-
teria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). 
We are also mindful of our own admonition: 
"Judicial interposition in the operation of the pub-
lic school system of the Nation raises problems re-
quiring care and restraint. . . . By and large, public 
education in our Nation is committed to the control 
of state and local authorities." Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). 
There are certain bench marks to guide us, however. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 
484 F 2d 1040 (CA9 1973) The Federal District Courts have held 
the Due Process Clause applicable to an interim suspension pending 
expulsion proceedings in Stnckhn \ Regents of University of Wiscon-
sin, supra, and Buck \ Carter, supra, to a 10-day suspension, Banks 
\ Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, 314 F Supp 285 (SD 
Fla 1970), vacated, 401 TJ S 988 (1971) (for entry of a fresh decree 
so that a timely appeal might be taken to the Court of Appeals), aff'd, 
450 F 2d 1103 (CAS 1971), to suspensions of under five days, Vail v 
Board of Education of Portsmouth School Dist, 354 F Supp 592 
(NH 1973), and to all suspensions, Mills v Board of Education 
of the Dist of Columbia, 348 F Supp 866 (DC 1972), and 
Givens \ Poe, 346 F Supp 202 (WDNC 1972), but inapplicable to 
suspensions of 25 days, Hernandez v. School District Number One, 
Denver, Colorado, 315 F Supp 289 (Colo 1970); to suspensions 
of 10 days, Baker v Downey City Board of Education, 307 F Supp. 
517 (CD Cal 1969), and to suspensions of eight davs, Hatter v Los 
Anqeles City High School District, 310 F Supp 1309 (CD Cal. 
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 452 F 2d 673 (CA9 1971) In the 
cases holding no process necessary m connection with short suspen-
sions, it is not always clear whether the court viewed the Due 
Process Clause as inapplicable, or simply felt that the process 
received was "due" even m the absence of some kind of hearing 
procedure. 
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(1950), a case»often invoked by later opinions, said that 
"[mjany controversies have raged about the cryptic and 
abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can 
be no doubt that at a minimum they require that depri-
vation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be 
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appro-
priate to the nature of the case." Id., at 313. "The 
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the oppor-
tunity to be heard," Grannis v. Or dean, 234 U. S. 385, 
394 (1914), a right that "has little reality or worth unless 
one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose 
for himself whether to . . . contest." Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Trust Co., supra, at 314. See also Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 550 (1965); Anti-Fascist Commit-
tee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168-169 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). At the very minimum, therefore, 
students facing suspension and the consequent interference 
with a protected property interest must be given some 
kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing. "Par-
ties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be 
heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they 
must first be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 
233 (1864). 
It also appears from our cases that the timing and 
content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will 
depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing 
interests involved. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra, 
at 895; Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 481. The stu-
dent's interest is to avoid unfair or mistaken exclusion 
from the educational process, with all of its unfortunate 
consequences. The Due Process Clause will not shield 
him from suspensions properly imposed, but it disserves 
both his interest and the interest of the State if his sus-
pension is in fact unwarranted. The concern would be 
mostly academic if the disciplinary process were a totally 
accurate, unerring process, never mistaken and never 
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unfair. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and no one 
suggests that it is. Disciplinarians, although proceeding 
in utmost good faith, frequently act on the reports and 
advice of others; and the controlling facts and the nature 
of the conduct under challenge are often disputed. The 
risk of error is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded 
against if that may be done without prohibitive cost or 
interference with the educational process. 
The difficulty is that our schools are vast and complex. 
Some modicum of discipline and order is essential if the 
educational function is to be performed. Events calling 
for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes re-
quire immediate, effective action. Suspension is consid-
ered not only to be a necessary tool to maintain order 
but a valuable educational device. The prospect of im-
posing elaborate hearing requirements in every suspension 
case is viewed with great concern, and many school au-
thorities may well prefer the untrammeled power to act 
unilaterally, unhampered by rules about notice and hear-
ing. But it would be a strange disciplinary system in an 
educational institution if no communication was sought 
by the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to in-
form him of his dereliction and to let him tell his side of 
the story in order to make sure that an injustice is not 
done. "[FJairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-
sided determination of facts decisive of rights. . . ." 
"Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-
righteousness gives too slender an assurance of Tightness. 
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at 
truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss 
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet 
it/ ' Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, supra, at 170, 
171-172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).9 
9
 The facts involved in this case illustrate the point. Betty Crome 
was suspended for conduct which did not occur on school grounds, 
and for which mass arrests were made—hardly guaranteeing careful 
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We do not believe that school authorities must be 
totally free from notice and hearing requirements if their 
schools are to operate with acceptable efficiency. Stu-
dents facing temporary suspension have interests qualify-
ing for protection of the Due Process Clause, and due 
process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 
days or less, that the student be given oral or written 
notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, 
an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and 
an opportunity to present his side of the story. The 
Clause requires at least these rudimentary precautions 
against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and 
arbitrary exclusion from school.10 
individualized factfinding by the police or by the school principal. 
She claims to have been involved in no misconduct. However, she 
was suspended for 10 days without ever being told what she was 
accused of doing or being given an opportunity to explain her pres-
ence among those arrested. Similarly, Dwight Lopez was suspended, 
along with many others, in connection with a disturbance in the 
lunchroom. Lopez says he was not one of those in the lunchroom 
who was involved. However, he was never told the basis for the 
principal's belief that he was involved, nor was he ever given an 
opportunity to explain his presence in the lunchroom. The school 
principals who suspended Crome and Lopez may have been correct 
on the merits, but it is inconsistent with the Due Process Clause to 
have made the decision that misconduct had occurred without at 
some meaningful time giving Crome or Lopez an opportunity to 
persuade the principals otherwise. 
We recognize that both suspensions were imposed during a time 
of great difficulty for the school administrations involved. At least 
in Lopez' case there may have been an immediate need to send home 
everyone in the lunchroom in order to preserve school order and 
property; and the administrative burden of providing 75 "hearings" 
of any kind is considerable. However, neither factor justifies a 
disciplinary suspension without at any time gathering facts relating 
to Lopez specifically, confronting him with them, and giving him an 
opportunity to explain. 
10
 Appellants point to the fact that some process is provided under 
Ohio law by way of judicial review. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2506.01 
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There need be no delay between the time "notice" is 
given and the time of the hearing. In the great majority 
of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the 
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has 
occurred. We hold only that, in being given an oppor-
tunity to explain his version of the facts at this discus-
sion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing 
and what the basis of the accusation is. Lower courts 
which have addressed the question of the nature of the 
procedures required in short suspension cases have 
reached the same conclusion. Tate v. Board of Educa-
tion, 453 F. 2d 975, 979 (CA8 1972); Vail v. Board of Ed-
ucation, 354 F. Supp. 592, 603 (NH 1973). Since 
the hearing may occur almost immediately following 
the misconduct, it follows that as a general rule 
notice and hearing should precede removal of the student 
from school. We agree with the District Court, however, 
that there are recurring situations in which prior notice 
and hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students whose 
presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property 
or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process 
may be immediately removed from school. In such cases, 
the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should fol-
(Supp 1973) Appellants do not cite any case in which this general 
administrative review statute has been used to appeal from a disci-
plinary decision b\ a school official If it be assumed that it could 
be so used, it is for two reasons insufficient to save inadequate pro-
cedures at the school level First, although new proof may be offered 
in a § 2501 06 proceeding. Shaker Coventry Corp v Shaker Heights 
Planning Comm'n, 18 Ohio Op 2d 272, 176 N E 2d 332 (1961), the 
proceeding is not de novo. In re Locke, 33 Ohio App 2d 177, 294 
N E 2d 230 (1972). Thus the decision by the school—even if made 
upon inadequate procedures—is entitled to weight in the court pro-
ceeding Second, without a demonstration to the contrary, we must 
assume that delay will attend any § 2501.06 proceeding, that the 
suspension will not be stayed pending hearing, and that the student 
meanwhile will irreparably lose his educational benefits 
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low as soon as practicable, as the District Court indicated. 
In holding as we do, we do not believe that we have 
imposed procedures on school disciplinarians which are 
inappropriate in a classroom setting. Instead we have 
imposed requirements which are, if anything, less than 
a fair-minded school principal would impose upon him-
self in order to avoid unfair suspensions. Indeed, accord-
ing to the testimony of the principal of Marion-Franklin 
High School, that school had an informal procedure, 
remarkably similar to that which we now require, appli-
cable to suspensions generally but which was not fol-
lowed in this case. Similarly, according to the most 
recent memorandum applicable to the entire CPSS, see 
n. 1, supra, school principals in the CPSS are now 
required by local rule to provide at least as much as the 
constitutional minimum which we have described. 
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause 
to require, countrywide, that hearings in connection with 
short suspensions must afford the student the opportunity 
to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to 
verify his version of the incident. Brief disciplinary 
suspensions are almost countless. To impose in each 
such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well 
overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, 
by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in ed-
ucational effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing 
the suspension process and escalating its formality and 
adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a 
regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness 
as part of the teaching process. 
On the other hand, requiring effective notice and in-
formal hearing permitting the student to give his version 
of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against 
erroneous action. At least the disciplinarian will be 
alerted to the existence of disputes about facts and argu-
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merits about cause and effect. He may then determine 
himself to summon the accuser, permit cross-examination, 
and allow the student to present his own witnesses. In 
more difficult cases, he may permit counsel. In any 
event, his discretion will be more informed and we think 
the risk of error substantially reduced. 
Requiring that there be at least an informal give-and-
take between student and disciplinarian, preferably prior 
to the suspension, will add little to the factfinding func-
tion where the disciplinarian himself has witnessed the 
conduct forming the basis for the charge. But things 
are not always as they seem to be, and the student will at 
least have the opportunity to characterize his conduct 
and put it in what he deems the proper context. 
We should also make it clear that we have addressed 
ourselves solely to the short suspension, not exceeding 
10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the re-
mainder of the school term, or permanently, may require 
more formal procedures. Nor do we put aside the possi-
bility that in unusual situations, although involving only 
a short suspension, something more than the rudimentary 
procedures will be required. 
IV 
The District Court found each of the suspensions in-
volved here to have occurred without a hearing, either 
before or after the suspension, and that each suspension 
was therefore invalid and the statute unconstitutional 
insofar as it permits such suspensions without notice or 
hearing. Accordingly, the judgment is Affirmed. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST 
join, dissenting. 
The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that per-
mits student suspensions from school without a hearing 
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"for not more than ten days/' * The decision unneces-
sarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the 
operation of our public schools that may affect adversely 
the quality of education. The Court holds for the first 
time that the federal courts, rather than educational 
officials and state legislatures, have the authority to 
determine the rules applicable to routine classroom disci-
pline of children and teenagers in the public schools. It 
justifies this unprecedented intrusion into the process of 
elementary and secondary education by identifying a 
new constitutional right: the right of a student not to 
be suspended for as much as a single day without notice 
and a due process hearing either before or promptly fol-
lowing the suspension.2 
The Court's decision rests on the premise that, under 
Ohio law, education is a property interest protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and 
therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hear-
ing.3 In my view, a student's interest in education is 
1
 The Ohio statute, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3313 66 (1972), actually 
is a limitation on the time-honored practice of school authorities them-
selves determining the appropriate duration of suspensions The 
statute allows the superintendent or principal of a public school to 
suspend a pupil "for not more than ten days " (italics supplied), 
and requires notification to the parent or guardian in writing withm 
24 hours of am suspension 
2
 Section 3313 66 also provides authority for the expulsion of pupils, 
but requires a hearing thereon by the school board upon request of 
a parent or guardian The rights of pupils expelled are not involved 
in this case, which concerns only the limited discretion of school 
authorities to suspend for not more than 10 days Expulsion, usually 
resulting at least in loss of a school year or semester, is an incom-
parably more serious matter than the brief suspension, traditionally 
used as the principal sanction for enforcing routine discipline The 
Ohio statute recognizes this distinction 
3
 The Court speaks of "exclusion from the educational process 
for more than a trivial period ," ante, at 576, but its opinion 
makes clear that even one day's suspension invokes the constitutional 
procedure mandated today. 
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In Personam Default Judgment in Utob *ha- mistake as to tim* or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawnya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. "37. trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jvr. 2d Juaf?mij»t3 § \25o 
% T o 8 e q ' An n T o T J 4. R« IQT 4. Ola Failure to give notice of application for de-C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
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A T n XT ., f ? , . r 4 i - fault judgment wherp notice is required only A.L.R. —Necessity of taking proof as to ha- . \
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bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L R 3d b>' custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
1070 Failure of pmly or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aqide, oi i*fus- Pretrial confeience, 55 A.L.RSd 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L R.3d Default judy-nonts against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55'e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key N u m b e r s . — Judgment «=» 92 to 134. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56, Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A parly see Jung to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof, 
(b) For defending party. A pnrty against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cioss-claim is asserted or a declai atory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part tbejeof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings (hereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law, A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon t V whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall he made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as v/ould be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
157 UTAH KULFS 01 CIWJ 1 RO< H>U V Rule 56 
there is a genuine issue for trial If he doe*- rot ^o if spond summary iudg 
merit, if appropriate, shall be enteied against him 
(f) When affidavits a i e unavailable Should it ippo<j Oom Iho affidavits 
of a parly opposing the motion that be tan ot foi leason^ ct'U^d present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opponhon the imvt n n \ refuse the 
application fo3 ludgment or rno\ older a cor Iinuance t ^ pn r,^i rffidowt6* to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken oi di^o* m to be had 11 m^v make such 
other order as is just 
(g) Affidavits made m bad faith Should it jpp QI to the ati^Uction of 
the court at any time that airy of the affidavits picsen'ed pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely foi the purnose of dehiv the court shall 
forthwith oidei the party emplownp them to pav to tin o*)\e\ party the 
amount of the reasonable expanses \ bich th* filme of Uv iffida\its caused 
him to incur, including reasonable alt IIIH s c ff» <• and anv oHending paitv or 
attorney may be adjudged guilt> of umt^mr 
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DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER, 
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ADDENDUM 
4. Trial Court Rulings. 
4a. Ruling On Plaintiff7s Motion For 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RORY J. ATCITTY, by and 




BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE : 
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL : 
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER, : 
Defendant. : 
: RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
: MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9607-39 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment supported by 
Memorandum to which the Defendants filed a responsive Memorandum. 
The Court heard oral argument, took the matter under advisement, 
and now issues this ruling. 
The exhibits reveal that on May 16, 1996, the Plaintiff was 
suspended from Whitehorse High School for ten days by Principal 
Lyman Grover. As grounds for summary judgment Plaintiff asserts 
that (1) the Board policies and procedures governing suspension and 
expulsion are vague and ambiguous, (2) the Plaintiff was not 
8^ 
2 
afforded a right to be heard, (3) Mr. Lyman Grover, as 
disciplinarian, was not impartial, (4) the Plaintiff was not 
provided with an opportunity to be heard in mitigation of 
punishment, and (5) Plaintiff was deprived of liberty interests. 
The Court rejects assertions (1), (3), and (5) for the reason 
that they were not pled in the Complaint and are raised for the 
first time in Plaintiff's memorandum. To consider those assertions 
first raised in a dispositive Motion would deprive the Defendants 
of adequate notice and permit unilateral amendment of the 
pleadings. The Court also finds that case law has held that there 
is no inherent conflict when a Principal acts in a dual capacity as 
an investigator and disciplinarian (Arrington v.Eberhard), nor are 
the District policies ambiguous with reference to how the 
administrator should conduct due process and suspension in the 
case . 
The Court also finds that in the context of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment there is a genuine issue of material 
fact which precludes summary judgment m favor of Plaintiff on the 
issue of whether Plaintiff was given an opportunity to be heard 
with regard to the alleged conduct of the Plaintiff and in 
3 
mitigation of punishment. There are facts which, if believed by 
the fact finder, would indicate that the Plaintiff was afforded an 
opportunity to be heard on at least one occasion within the meaning 
of the Goss decision. 
The Court also rejects the notion that this is an unusual case 
entitling Plaintiff to any "enhanced" due process or additional 
safeguards other than that contemplated by Goss. The due process 
is basically "an informal give-and-take between student and 
disciplinarian." 
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is therefore denied. 
DATED this / day of July, 1997. 
BRYCE/K. BRYNER 
District Court Judge1 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the y^ day of July, 1997, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Eric P. Swenson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 94 0 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Rosalie Reilly 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 4 04 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
L. Robert Anderson 
Daniel G. Anderson 
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
81 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
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Defendants and Appellees. 
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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER, : 
Defendant. : 
: RULING ON DEFENDANTS' 
: MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
: JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9607-39 
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that 
there is no genuine issue as to the material facts set forth in its 
Memorandum. Plaintiff responded by filing a Memorandum in 
Opposition. The Court heard the oral argument of the parties, took 
the matter under advisement, and now issues this Ruling. 
Plaintiff's sole claim for relief in his Complaint asserts 
that he was denied a due process hearing concerning his expulsion. 
It is clear that the Plaintiff in this case was suspended from 
Whitehorse High School for a period of ten days by Principal Lyman 
i<^ 
2 
Grover on May 16, 1997. Suspensions of ten days or less are 
governed by the holding in Goss vs. Lopez and this Court gives 
deference to the principles enunciated in that case. Plaintiff is 
therefore entitled to the due process protections clearly defined 
by that case which are: (1) Plaintiff shall be given oral or 
written notice of the charges against him, and if he denies them, 
(2) an explanation of the evidence that the authorities have, and 
(3) an opportunity to present his side of the story. 
The Court is satisfied from the depositions, Affidavits, and 
pleadings on file that the Plaintiff was given oral notice of the 
charges against him together with an explanation of the evidence 
against him, and that he was given an opportunity on several 
occasions to present his side of the story in an informal setting. 
The Court finds that the requirements of Goss were met and that 
there are no genuine issues of material facts on these elements. 
The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff was not denied a due 
process hearing as claimed in his Complaint and that Defendants are 
entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law. 
From the pleadings, Affidavits, and depositions on file the 
Court cannot find that the Complaint was frivolous. Plaintiff 
3 
presented a tenable position, portions of which could be deemed to 
be supported by case law. Defendants' application for attorney 
fees is therefore denied. 
DATED this / day of July, 1997. 
^ 
. ^ ^ r . f^^t<__-> 
BRYCE Yp BRYNEI 
/ 7 
District Court Judge 
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Defendants and Appellees. ] 
i Case No. 980096-CA 
i Priority No. 15 
ADDENDUM 
4. Trial Court Rulings. 
4c Ruling On Motion To Strike 
Affidavit Of Lyman Grover. 
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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL : 
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER, : 
Defendant. : 
: RULING ON MOTION TO 
: STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
: LYMAN GROVER 
Civil No. 9607-39 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Lyman 
Grover supported by Memorandum to which the Defendants filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition. The Court now rules as follows: 
The Court has reviewed and compared the deposition testimony 
of Lyman Grover with his Affidavit in detail and cannot find that 
there are any material or substantial inconsistencies between them 
regarding the issues of whether the Plaintiff and his father were 
afforded an adequate and timely opportunity to be heard in regards 
to the charges, and whether Lyman Grover acted in a dual role as a 
stf 
school disciplinarian and law enforcement agent. The Court also 
finds that the Defendants did not engage in delay or bad faith by 
submitting the Affidavit. 
For the reasons above stated the Motion to Strike is denied. 
DATED this / day of July, 1997. 
District Court Judge 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the
 (yfl day of July, 1997, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF LYMAN GROVER was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Eric P. Swenson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 94 0 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Rosalie Reilly 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 4 04 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
L. Robert Anderson 
Daniel G. Anderson 
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
81 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
$r. oon.|.l»K* v,.lh Ihe Americans v,.J» ^ ^ ^ J ^ 
,n 1 -MXJ> 
&° 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RORY J. ATCITTY, by and 
through his parent Roger ] 
Atcitty, Sr. , 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
XT 
V • 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE | 
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL ] 
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
) Case No. 980096-CA 
i Priority No. 15 
ADDENDUM 
4. Trial Court Rulings. 
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To File An Amended Complaint. 
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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER, : 
Defendant. : 
: RULING ON MOTION FOR 
: LEAVE TO FILE AN 
: AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 9607-39 
On March 6, 1997 the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to 
File an Amended Complaint together with Memorandum to which the 
Defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition. The Court heard oral 
argument, took the matter under advisement, and now issues this 
Ruling. 
The Motion for Leave to Amend is denied for the reasons that: 
1. The Motion filed on March 6, 1997 is untimely. The 
discovery cut-off date was December 27, 1996 and both parties had 
completed extensive discovery. Motions for Summary Judgment were 
«u 
2 
also filed by the parties on February 14, 1997, and February 27, 
19 97, respectively. 
2. To allow the Complaint to be amended at this stage 
of the proceedings would prejudice the Defendants. If the 
amendment were to be allowed, Defendants would justifiably be 
entitled to conduct discovery to meet the new allegations contained 
in the Amended Complaint. This would result in additional expenses 
and investments of time and resources to Defendants, all of which 
could have been avoided had the Motion been timely made. 
3. The Court rejects Plaintiff's characterization of 
the proposed amendments as merely setting forth facts learned in 
the discovery process. The Court finds that the proposed Amended 
Complaint sets forth new issues to which Defendants would be 
entitled to respond, discover, and file dispositive Motions, 
resulting in delay of a final resolution of this matter. 
it! 
DATED this / day of July, 1997. 
BRYCE/K. BRYNER 
District Court Judge 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the jy day of July, 1997, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
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following: 
Eric P. Swenson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 94 0 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Rosalie Reilly 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 4 04 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
L. Robert Anderson 
Daniel G. Anderson 
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
81 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
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